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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In its first term, the Obama Administration signed into law two tax 
reforms, each designed to protect an increasingly vulnerable income tax 
base, and each of which had the potential to set a new and unprecedented 
course for no less than the regulation of the global economy by the nation-
state. The first reform, known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA), sought to end global tax evasion through tax havens.1  The 
 *  Allison Christians, H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Taxation, McGill University Faculty of 
Law. Thanks are due to the participants of the Pepperdine Law Review Symposium on Tax Advice 
for the Second Obama Administration, January 18, 2013, for their insightful comments, to the editors 
of the Pepperdine Law Review, and to Montano Cabezas, to whom I am indebted for his tireless 
efforts and consistent excellence in research assistance.  This article is part of Pepperdine Law 
Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration symposium, co-
sponsored by Tax Analysts. 
 1.  Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act §§ 501–531,  Pub. L. No. 111–147,  124 Stat. 
71 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/PLAW-111publ147/pdf/PLAW-111publ147.pdf. 
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second, a little-noticed two-page addendum to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),2 sought to end the 
contribution of American multinationals to corruption in governance by 
codifying the transparency principles of the global Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI).3 
Both of these regimes cast a vastly more global role for the nation-state 
in regulating its people and their resources.  Each thus represents a move in 
the right direction, since a declining role for the state in the regulation of the 
global economy translates to the decline, disarray, and eventually the 
complete dismantling of income taxation as a viable means for raising 
revenue.  But neither of these reforms has yet to fulfill its potential.  First, 
each raises difficult questions about what the state can and cannot do to 
enforce disclosure and compliance.4  Failing to answer these questions 
impedes the implementation of each regime and aggravates the steady 
decline of taxpayer morale.5  Second, neither is broad enough: FATCA 
should be fully reciprocal while carving out Americans resident in other 
countries,6 and EITI should expand beyond the extractive industries to 
public companies more generally.  By acknowledging and responding in a 
principled way to the obstacles that limit their effectiveness, a second 
Obama Administration could take significant steps to bring each reform to 
its potential, while ensuring that its scope focuses on the intended target in 
each case.  This Article outlines how these proposals could be accomplished 
and makes the case that they should be attempted. 
Part I provides the background for the discussion by describing the 
enactment of each reform, and exploring the legislators’ expressed intentions 
as well as the political, social, and cultural context surrounding the reforms’ 
enactment.  Part II explores how each regime redefines the role of the 
 2.   Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1504, 15 U.S.C.A. § 
78m(q) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-208). 
 3.   See The Cardin-Lugar Amendment (Dodd-Frank 1504), PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY,  
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/about/stock-listings/cardin-lugar-amendment-dodd-frank-1504 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013).  EITI grew out of the Publish What You Pay movement.  See History of 
EITI, EITI, http://eiti.org/eiti/history (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 4.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 5.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 6.   Although the FATCA’s Model Inter-Governmental Agreements do have “reciprocal” 
versions, the reciprocity is mostly aspirational in nature.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MODEL 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND TO IMPLEMENT FATCA 
13–14 (Nov. 14, 2012),[hereinafter MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT] available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/joint_intl_statement_fatca_260712.pdf (“Reciprocity[:] The 
[Government of the] United States acknowledges the need to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal 
automatic information exchange with [FATCA Partner].  The [Government of the] United States is 
committed to further improve transparency and enhance the exchange relationship with [FATCA 
Partner] by pursuing the adoption of regulations and advocating and supporting relevant legislation 
to achieve such equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic exchange.”). 
12 CHRISTIANS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:09 AM 
[Vol. 40: 1373, 2013] Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1375 
nation-state in the regulation of its taxpayers and their resources, and why a 
principled definition of that role is vital for the future of income taxation not 
only in the U.S., but also globally.  Part III raises some of the difficult issues 
that require resolution for further advancement of the underlying goals 
outlined in Part II.  The Article concludes with aspirations for a revived role 
for the nation-state in the regulation of the global economy and a renewed 
vigor for the protection of income taxation. 
II.  BACKGROUND: WHY THESE REFORMS, AND WHY NOW? 
Income taxation is under grave threat.7  Every nation-state in the world 
is both a participant and a potential victim in a global game of tax 
competition that erodes and undermines comprehensive income taxation 
wherever it is attempted.  Each nation must safeguard its tax base against the 
aggressive maneuvering of its taxpayers, aided in their quest by too-easily 
manipulated rules and the complicity of foreign intermediaries—be they 
public or private—that stand to gain by being a mercenary in this global 
game.8  At the same time, each nation benefits itself by embracing 
 7.   See Allison Christians, Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice in THE CARTER 
COMMISSION: FIFTY YEARS LATER (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that states are presiding over the 
increasingly unjust exercise of taxation as globalization erodes the foundational principles of the 
income tax). 
 8.   I use the term “mercenary” here to connote the negative casting by various academics and 
governmental institutions of certain tax competition practices by states and their financial 
institutions.  For further discussion see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX 
PRACTICES: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998); Vito Tanzi, Globalization and the Work of Fiscal 
Termites, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 2001,  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/tanzi.htm; 
Richard Hay, OECD Report on ‘Level Playing Field’ Imminent, 9 MANAGING PARTNER 1, 1 (2006) 
(stating that the OECD’s project threatens to “shut non-cooperating international financial centers 
out of the world’s banking and securities markets” in violation of “[a] longstanding principle of 
international law [that] limits taxing rights to those which a country can enforce without the need for 
assistance from others”); Lawrence Speer, Conservative Think Tanks Attack OECD on Offshore Tax 
Scrutiny During Forum, DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 15, 2005, at G-3 (2005) (reporting description of the 
anti-tax havens campaign as “hypocritical,” “a thinly disguised move by industrialized countries 
toward forced harmonization of tax policies at the global level,” and an attempt to create “‘a new tax 
cartel’”); Daniel J. Mitchell, An OECD Proposal to Eliminate Tax Competition Would Mean Higher 
Taxes and Less Privacy, 1395 BACKGROUNDER 1, 18 (2000), available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/reports/2000/09/oecd-proposal-to-eliminate-tax-competition (OECD project “an attack on 
sovereignty”); Jinyan Li, Tax Sovereignty and International Tax Reform: The Author’s Response, 52 
CAN. TAX J. 141, 146 (“External forces may make a country give up its sovereignty. One example is 
the OECD-led harmful tax competition campaign.”).  I discuss the troublesome aspects of casting 
some practices—but not others—in this moralistic light in Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation 
and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99, 115–16 (2009)  (“OECD rhetoric is susceptible to 
interpretation as little more than a means to mask or legitimize what is essentially an illegitimate use 
of political or economic force to achieve the aims of the powerful against those of the weak.”). 
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mercenary behavior against other nations in order to capture as much global 
capital as possible, even if such action deprives other nations of revenue.9 
The story of FATCA and EITI in the United States is the story of a 
virtually pathological internal struggle on the question of whether and how 
to promote or prevent mercenary behavior, both within and beyond the state.  
Each reform represents an attempt to curb the mercenary instincts of foreign 
states and opportunistic U.S. taxpayers.  FATCA tries to accomplish this 
goal by exerting control over foreign financial institutions, while EITI does 
so by exerting it over U.S. multinationals.  This section describes the 
mercenary tendency and how FATCA and EITI respond in turn. 
A.  Tax Competition and the Mercenary Tendency of the Tax State 
One way of looking at the post-Westphalian world is as a society of 
nations, divided along territorial lines, which are in direct competition with 
each other for the world’s resources but enlightened enough to work with 
each other to prevent total war.  In such a world, nations bind themselves 
and one another to the mast in international agreements with the intention of 
preventing the unwanted scenario of total destruction, but then engage in 
everyday acts of sabotage against these binds in order to advance their own 
interests at the expense of others.10  In taxation, the tendency toward this 
“agree in form, defect in practice” behavior is manifested in the means by 
which states create and manipulate for their own benefit an evolving set of 
international standards and norms (sometimes but not always of their own 
making) around a global flow of information about economic resources and 
their owners.11  Strategies that work to interrupt that flow to serve national 
 9.   See, e.g, Adam Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV 923 
(2010). 
 10.   See Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S61 (2002) 
(demonstrating how interest groups, especially national legislators and powerful taxpayers, 
consistently undermine global tax harmonization efforts in order to promote their own social and 
economic positions); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 280–81 (2001) (arguing that 
according to the logic of democracy, nations should prioritize their own interests, rather than engage 
in any campaign to seek global tax justice); Tsilly Dagan, National Interests in the International Tax 
Game, 18 VA. TAX REV. 363 (1998) (stating that since global coordination and cooperation are 
virtually impossible to attain, nations should maximize their own long-term welfare). 
 11.   See Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407 (2012); Michael McIntyre, 
How to End the Charade of Information Exchange, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 255, 255 (2009), available 
at http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/mcintyre/text/mcintyre_articles/Treaties/ charade_56TNI.pdf 
(describing current information sharing agreements as ineffective in design and in practice, 
delivering nothing more than “an undeserved patina of respectability” in the form of symbolic 
cooperation); Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax 
Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV. 155 (2007) (suggesting that cooperation in tax matters might serve long-
term national interests, but defecting definitely serves short-term ones). 
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interests, especially in the name of competition, have been portrayed as 
appropriate and even justice-oriented by prominent tax scholars.12 
In such a world, using national competitiveness as a normative 
benchmark for a regulatory scheme can easily translate into advocacy for 
mercenary behavior by the state.  This is illustrated in statements like those 
made by Congressman Paul Ryan in 2011: 
[W]e need to have a tax system that makes America a haven for 
capital formation.  Let’s make this country a tax shelter for other 
countries instead of having other countries be a tax shelter for 
America.  This would ultimately raise revenues and promote 
economic growth.13 
The message is clear that although eradicating American tax evasion is a 
worthy goal for the state, facilitating tax evasion is the better strategy when 
it comes to foreign taxpayers and their home states.  The sentiment is echoed 
in statements by legislators who oppose changing United States tax reporting 
rules on interest to ensure that the United States informs foreign countries 
about income earned by their taxpayers through United States financial 
institutions.  For example, in opposition to a proposed expansion of such 
reporting in 2003, then-Senator Gordon Smith expressed his failure to 
understand “why we put the enforcement of other nations’ tax laws as a 
priority at Treasury,” and urged the Treasury not to “drive the savings of 
foreigners out of bank accounts in the United States and into bank accounts 
in other nations.”14  Private sector advocates similarly argue that interest 
reporting would “hinder tax competition between nations” and “help 
oppressive governments track down flight capital.”15 
 12.   For example, Michael Graetz cites John Rawls’s Law of Peoples for the proposition that 
seeking advantage must take priority over cooperation since “we regard our obligation for the well-
being of our fellow citizens as more pressing than for people in need elsewhere in the world.”  See 
Graetz, supra note 10, at 277–78.  Rawls’ critics contest this assertion on the ground that there is no 
morally sound foundation for making such a claim and that the claim itself is contradicted in Rawls’ 
own writings.  See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, JOHN RAWLS: HIS LIFE AND THEORY OF JUSTICE 
(Michelle Kosch trans., 2007). 
 13.   Geoffrey Gabor, Inside The Budget Battle with Congressman Paul Ryan, TJE AM. BUS. 
MAG. (Aug. 1, 2011),  http://www.americanbusinessmag.com/2011/08/inside-the-budget-battle-with-
congressman-paul-ryan/. 
 14.   Interest Reporting, Smith, Inhofe Urge Treasury to Reconsider Nonresident Alien Interest 
Reporting Rules, DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 20, 2003, at 8, 9 (concerning proposed non-resident alien 
interest reporting rules). 
 15.   Letter from Senator Gordon H. Smith to John Snow, Secretary of the Treasury (Feb. 13, 
2003), available at http://archive.freedomandprosperity.org/ltr/smith-irs/smith-irs.pdf. 
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National competitiveness also translates into a complementary form of 
mercenary behavior by the state—namely, the aggressive use of tax rate and 
base competition to entice multinational businesses.  The former is well 
documented: corporate tax rates are in a clear and steady downward trend 
globally.16  The latter, consisting of tax incentives, holidays, credits, and 
special deals for inbound investment, is less quantifiable in terms of size and 
impact but no less clearly a global trend.17 Together, rate and base 
competition constitute another form of the race to the bottom, a beggar-thy-
neighbor contest that leaves states worse off than they might be if they 
cooperated in setting—and adhering to—baseline standards for minimal 
taxation of business.18 
Competitiveness, however, cannot be easily dismissed as a national 
goal, even if it does promote various forms of mercenary behavior by the 
state.  It must be readily acknowledged that the United States is just one 
country that must compete with all others for a share of global resources, 
including global capital.19  The U.S. has in many ways been a leader in 
 16.   See, e.g., Eoin Callanin Washington, Greenspan Warns on Borrowing Costs, FIN. TIMES, 
July 27, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0c5556fa-3bd9-11dc-8002-0000779fd2ac.html (quoting 
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan: “Other nations have seen the results of the bold 
tax reforms enacted by the U.S. in the 1980s and they have moved to follow our example. And with 
much of the world having reduced their corporate rates, we now have the second highest statutory 
corporate tax rate among OECD nations.”); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Treasury Releases Business 
Taxation and Global Competitiveness Background Paper 36 (July 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/07230%20r.pdf (“Since 1980, the 
United States has gone from a high corporate tax-rate country to a low-rate country (following the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986) and, based on some measures, back again to a high-rate country today 
because other countries recently have reduced their corporate tax rates . . . .  The evolution of OECD 
tax rates over the past two decades suggests that [corporate income tax] rate setting is an interactive 
game subject to the pressures of international competition.”); Henry M. Paulson Jr., Our Broken 
Corporate Tax Code, WALL STREET J., July 19, 2007,  at A15 (“Over the past two decades, 
while . . . our statutory corporate income tax rate has increased, other nations have been reducing 
their rates to replicate our miracle . . . .  It’s not surprising then, that average OECD corporate tax 
rates have trended steadily downward.”). 
 17.   Because tax incentives take a number of different forms and may often be hidden in 
expenditure budgets and policies that are not explicitly tax-related, it is difficult to count or measure 
their existence and impact.  There are already many regimes that use such non-rate incentives and 
the use of these indirect means appears to be growing.  See, e.g., Allison Christians, Global Trends 
and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least Developed Countries, 42 U.B.C. L. REV. 239 (2010); 
Herbert Jauch, Export Processing Zones and the  Quest for Sustainable Development: A Southern 
African Perspective, 14 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 101 (2002). 
 18.   That is not to say that all states would be better off in such a world, since that is obviously 
not the case.  For a discussion see Adam Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. 
L. REV. 717 (2012). 
 19.    See, e.g., DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MAPPING GLOBAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS: FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/ 
McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Financial%20Markets/Mapping%20glo
bal%20capital%20markets%20-%20Fifth%20annual%20report/MGI_Mapping_capital_markets_fift 
h_annual_report.ashx; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, at ix (November 30, 2006), available at 
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creating this competition, but it does not act independently of other 
countries.  For example, the U.S. adoption of the portfolio interest 
exemption is credited with an immediate tidal wave of capital flight out of 
Latin America into the U.S. financial system and was followed by a global 
trend against portfolio income taxation.20  But the U.S. portfolio exemption 
was itself a response to similar exemptions in the Eurobond market.21  
Similarly, the U.S. rules that allow multinational businesses to defer 
(indefinitely) any income taxes in the U.S. create the conditions for global 
tax rate and base competition by other countries.22  Since other countries 
have adopted similar deferral rules, any proposed change of course in the 
U.S. could put the U.S. at an instant disadvantage internationally.23 
Despite the inescapable fact of competition, the U.S. cannot afford to 
completely destroy its income tax base in a race to the bottom.  It is a 
developed country whose citizens demand a certain level of government 
services, and these services must be paid for, generally with tax revenues 
collected more or less from its own taxpayers.24  The evidence of a century 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf  (“[T]he United States 
is losing its leading competitive position as compared to stock markets and financial centers 
abroad.”); Down on the Street, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25,  2006, http://www.economist.com/ 
node/8316406; Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn From 
London, WALL STREET J., Nov. 1, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116234404428809 
623.html. 
 20.   See, e.g., VITO TANZI, TAXATION IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD 130–31 (1995) (By 1993, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, and the UK 
exempted foreign-owned interest earned from domestic bank accounts); see also Mitchell B. Weiss, 
International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99, 108 
(2001) (“[N]ot surprisingly, one country after the next responded in kind, introducing measures that 
not only discouraged the outbound migration of their country’s capital, but also encouraged the 
importation of large amounts of capital from higher-taxing jurisdictions.  Some countries created 
tax-exempt domestic investment opportunities; some relaxed their enforcement efforts; but most 
followed the U.S.’s lead, exempting their withholding tax on imported interest income and 
substantially cutting their corporate and individual tax rates.”). 
 21.   See Craig M. Boise & Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in 
Offshore Financial Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 377 
(2009). 
 22.   See J. Clifton Fleming et al., Worse Than Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009). 
 23.   See J. Clifton Fleming et al., Some Perspectives from the United States on the Worldwide 
Taxation vs. Territorial Taxation Debate, J. AUSTRALASIAN TAX TCHRS. ASS’N, Dec. 2008, at 35. 
 24.   Of course, the U.S.—like any other country—imposes tax on foreign persons who invest in 
the country.  See e.g., I.R.C. § 871–885.  However, the revenue raised from foreign persons is 
minuscule compared to that raised from U.S. persons.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIVIDUAL 
RETURNS 2005, at 15–18 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05inalcr.pdf (noting that 
2005 domestic individual returns totaled approximately $935 billion); SCOTT LUTTRELL, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., FOREIGN RECIPIENTS OF U.S. INCOME 2007, at 121 (2010), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10winbulforeignreceps.pdf (noting that 2005 foreign individual U.S. 
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of taxation in the modern state suggests that these taxpayers demand at least 
the patina of fairness in the taxes they are willing to accept.25  Blatant 
shirking of tax obligations, perhaps especially by those most able to bear the 
burden of taxation, is an assault on taxpayer morale that will eventually lead 
to the destruction of the entire tax system via noncompliance.26  Thus, even 
those who advocate for mercenary policies, such as Paul Ryan, argue that 
“there must be a decrease in the amount of tax shelters for people to park 
their income overseas.”27 Moreover, as the world’s largest economy, the 
United States may be one of only a few nations that can afford to restrict its 
own pace in the race to the bottom in order protect the tax base—even if that 
dulls its own edge in the global tax game.  This leadership status does not 
make the national discussion over taxation easy, as anyone following U.S. 
tax policy over the past several years can readily attest.28 
source withholdings via IRS form 1042S totaled approximately $10 billion); INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., 2006 STATISTICS OF INCOME: CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2–3, 172–83 (2012), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06coccr.pdf (noting that 2006 domestic corporate returns 
totaled approximately $353 billion while returns from foreign-controlled domestic corporations via 
form 1120 totaled approximately $50 billion); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2003 CORPORATION 
RETURNS: RETURNS OF ACTIVE CORPORATIONS (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/03co10is.xls; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2003 
CORPORATION RETURNS: RETURNS WITH NET INCOME (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irssoi/03co11is.xls (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (noting that 2003 
effective income tax receipts from foreign corporations with U.S. business operations via IRS form 
1120-F totaled approximately $600 million). 
 25.   See, e.g., TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE (Joseph Jacobs Thorndike & Dennis Ventry 
eds., Urban Institute Press 2002).  The fact that the United States remains the only developed 
country in the world without a national sales tax may be attributed in part to the reluctance of the 
U.S. population to accept what it perceives as a regressive tax.  See, e.g., CARL DAVIS ET AL., INST. 
ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY, WHO PAYS?: A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS 
IN ALL 50 STATES 3–4 (3d ed. Nov. 2009), available at http://www.itepnet.org/whopays3.pdf (“Four 
of the ten most regressive tax systems—those of Washington, South Dakota, Tennessee, and 
Nevada—rely very heavily on regressive sales and excise taxes.”); contra Paul Krugman, Why I’m 
Soft On Sales Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2012, 5:38 PM)), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/why-im-soft-on-sales-taxes/.  However, the omission 
may be attributable to a general resistance to any new taxes, regardless of their perceived 
distributional impact.  See, e.g., Mervyn A. King, The Cash Flow Corporate Income Tax, in THE 
EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, 377, 379 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1987) (“There 
is truth in the well-known adage that ‘an old tax is a good tax.’”). 
 26.   See Itai Grinberg et al., Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence from Surveys and an 
Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447 (2009); Bruno S. Frey & Benno 
Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 136 (2007) (noncompliance 
by other taxpayers tends to decrease a taxpayer’s tax morale and compliance). 
 27.   Gabor, supra note 13. 
 28.   The recent debt ceiling and fiscal cliff standoffs are excellent examples of the nature of 
debate surrounding fiscal matters in the U.S.  See, e.g., Robert Pear, Obama to Ask for $1.2 Trillion 
Increase in Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/ 
us/politics/obama-to-ask-for-1-2-trillion-increase-in-debt-limit.html; Robert Pear, Senate Vote 
Approves Rise in Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/ 
politics/senate-approves-1-2-trillion-debt-limit-rise.html; Jonathan Weisman, Republicans Pledge 
New Standoff on Debt Limit, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/us/ 
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FATCA and EITI emerge as evidence of the internal struggle over how 
and to what extent the United States ought to move in the direction of 
embracing or rejecting the mercenary tendency both in its own policymaking 
and in that of its competitors.  The passage of each reform suggests that 
there is at least some significant constituency in the United States that 
prioritizes protecting the income tax over blindly pursuing strategies that 
will ultimately destroy it.  In order to understand the potentially precedent-
setting role these legal reforms play in redefining the right and the duty of 
the nation state to regulate its taxpayers and their resources in a global 
economy, we must consider what the rules do in technical terms as well as 
what condition for change they were seen as necessary to fulfill when the 
first Obama administration brought them into being. 
B.  Monitoring Taxpayers Through Third Party Reporting 
FATCA came into force as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore 
Employment Act (HIRE Act), which was signed into law by President 
Obama on March 18, 2010.29  The HIRE Act was a jobs bill that included 
payroll tax holidays and other credits for employers.  FATCA was unrelated 
to this purpose, but was included in the form of revenue-raising “Offset 
Provisions.”30  This is a bit of a canard: although the Chair of the House 
politics/gop-pledges-new-standoff-on-debt-limit.html; Helene Cooper, Obama and House 
Republicans Offer Taste of Renewed Fight Over the Debt Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/us/politics/obama-presses-congress-to-act-on-his-priorities.htm 
l; Jackie Calmes, Demystifying the Fiscal Impasse That Is Vexing Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/us/politics/the-fiscal-cliff-explained.html; Jennifer 
Steinhauer, Divided House Passes Tax Deal in End to Latest Fiscal Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/us/politics/house-takes-on-fiscal-cliff.html; The Fiscal 
Cliff Deal: America’s European Moment, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2013, http://www.economist.com/ 
news/leaders/21569024-troubling-similarities-between-fiscal-mismanagement-washington-and-
mess. 
 29.   Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act,  Pub. L. No. 111–147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010) 
(codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
111publ147/pdf/PLAW-111publ147.pdf. 
 30.   The placement as a revenue raiser tacked onto a bill aimed at unrelated objectives has been 
viewed by opponents of FATCA as a sign that its passage was undertaken with some degree of 
stealth.  See, e.g., FATCA: The Empire Strikes Back, RECOVER PARTNERS BLOG (July 4, 2011), 
http://www.recoverypartners.biz/blog/2011/07/04/fatca-the-empire-strikes-back/; Koshek Rama 
Moorthi, FATCA: Obama’s New Year Surprise Against American Expats, EXAMINER (Nov. 30, 
2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/fatca-obama-s-new-year-surprise-against-american-expats; 
ACA’s Voice in the News, AM. CITIZENS ABROAD (Oct. 2012), http://americansabroad.org/news-and-
events/aca-s-voice-in-the-news/.  Although it may appear anomalous to observers from other 
countries, the addition of unrelated riders and last minute addenda, especially revenue raisers, is a 
standard feature of U.S. lawmaking.  For a brief discussion of how reconciliation and pay-as-you-go 
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Budget Committee claimed that the HIRE Act was a responsible piece of 
legislation that was “fully paid for . . . by cracking down on overseas tax 
havens,”31 in fact the relatively paltry sums projected to be raised under 
FATCA could do little by way of offset, even if they had been implemented 
right away.32 
FATCA arose directly in response to publicity surrounding well-known 
and venerable foreign institutions, most especially in Switzerland, that have 
helped U.S. customers hide income and assets from the IRS.33  The publicity 
rules and standards affect tax policymaking in the U.S. see Policy Basics: Introduction to the 
Federal Budget Process, CENTER ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-7-03bud.pdf.  Presented as a revenue offset at the tail end of a long, 
complex, and contested piece of legislation did allow FATCA to pass with minimal debate or 
discussion in 2010.  But the seeds for FATCA had been sown in earlier legislative attempts, both in 
Senator Levin’s Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2009 and Senator Baucus’ stand-alone FATCA of 
2009.  See Summary of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2011, CARL LEVIN (July 12, 2011) 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/summary-of-the-stop-tax-haven-abuse-act-of-
2011/; H.R. 3933 (111th): Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US (Oct. 27, 
2009), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3933; see also Douglas Shulman, Prepared 
Remarks of Commissioner Douglas Shulman Before the 22nd Annual George Washington University 
International Tax Conference (Dec. 10, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Prepared-Remarks-of-Commissioner-Douglas-Shulman-before-the-22nd—
Annual-George-Washington-University-International-Tax-Conference) (stating that “the 
Administration and the IRS are focused on a multi-year international tax compliance strategy . . .  to 
put a serious dent in offshore tax evasion” and expressing support for the FATCA Act of 2009). 
 31.   156 CONG. REC. H1152 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2010) (statement of Sen. Allyson Schwartz),  
(“[T]he HIRE Act is fully paid for and it does not add to the annual deficit. It is paid for by cracking 
down on overseas tax havens.”). 
 32.   See 156 CONG. REC. S2369–70 (April 9, 2010), (daily ed. April 15, 2010) (enclosure 
provided by of Douglas Elmendorf) (showing that the HIRE Act was expected to produce a revenue 
deficit in the amount of $4,380,000); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Letter and Table Outlining Budgetary 
Effects of HIRE Act, (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
ftpdocs/112xx/doc11230/hr2847.pdf (showing amounts expected to be raised by FATCA provisions 
as $343 million, $448 million, and $710 million, for 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively).  That 
precarious budgetary situation was aggravated by the fact that while the spending provisions of the 
HIRE Act were immediately implemented, most of the FATCA provisions have yet to be enforced.  
For example, the disclosure of U.S. accounts by foreign financial institutions was, according to the 
statute, to begin after December 2012, but the enforcement has been delayed by the Treasury since 
regulations interpreting the statute were not finalized until January, 2013.  See Hiring Incentives to 
Restore Employment Act §§ 501–502 (giving the original implementation schedule); I.R.S. Notice 
2012-42 (Oct. 24, 2012) (which delays the implementation of information reporting until March 31, 
2015 and gross withholding until January 1, 2017); see also DLA PIPER, COMPARISON OF FATCA 
TIMEFRAMES (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Tax-
news-Chart__Oct2012.pdf. 
 33.  See William McGurn, Obama’s IRS Snoops Abroad, WALL STREET J., July 16, 2012,, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303933704577531280097324446.html (“David 
Axelrod invoked the holy grail behind the FATCA led, global IRS expansion.  ‘We lose $100 billion 
a year to offshore tax shelters,’ Mr. Axelrod told CNN.”).  For background information on base 
erosion via offshore holdings see David Voreacos, Offshore Tax Scorecard: UBS, Credit Suisse, 
HSBC, Julius Baer, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 12, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-
10-12/offshore-tax-scorecard-ubs-credit-suisse-hsbc-julius-baer.html; Kim Dixon, Nearly 15,000 
Americans Admit Offshore Tax Cheating, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2009), 
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continues, reinforcing the need for the protection of the U.S. tax base against 
erosion through criminal activity.34  Thus FATCA is cast in a defensive role 
against the potential mercenary behavior of foreign states that provide the 
regulatory cover for U.S. taxpayers to evade their tax obligations at home. 
The sponsors and supporters of FATCA have stated a persuasive case 
for the expansion of IRS efforts against mercenary behavior, namely, the 
blatant efforts of foreign banks to deliberately seek out American elites and 
help them evade their tax obligations to the United States.35  As Senator Carl 
Levin explained: 
 The reason for this strong approach was seen dramatically in 
hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.  A 
July 2008 hearing, for example, showed how two foreign banks, 
UBS AG of Switzerland and LGT Bank of Liechtenstein, used a 
variety of secrecy tricks to help U.S. clients open foreign bank 
accounts and hide millions of dollars in assets from U.S. tax 
authorities.  One 2004 UBS document indicated that 52,000 U.S. 
clients had Swiss accounts that had not been disclosed to the IRS.  
UBS estimated that those hidden accounts contained a total of about 
$18 billion in cash, securities, and other assets.  In order to defer a 
criminal prosecution against the bank by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, UBS admitted that it had participated in a scheme to 
defraud the United States of tax revenues, paid a $750 million fine, 
and agreed to stop opening accounts that are not disclosed to the 
IRS.  UBS also agreed to reveal the names of a limited number of 
U.S. accountholders, although the bulk of the 52,000 still may 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AG3IU20091117; Martin Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide 
Hundreds of Billions in the Caymans, TAX NOTES, May 24, 2004, at 96; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Department of Justice Asks Court to Serve Summons for Offshore Records (Apr. 15, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-tax-349.html (“Some United States 
taxpayers are evading billions of dollars per year in United States taxes through the use of offshore 
accounts”). 
 34.   See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, South Florida Woman Pleads Guilty to 
Failing to Disclose Income from Swiss Bank Accounts and Agrees to $21 Million Penalty (Jan. 8, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-tax-030.html (“‘The Justice 
Department continues to pursue those who hide income and assets from the IRS through the use of 
nominee businesses and offshore bank accounts,’ said Assistant Attorney General Keneally. ‘U.S. 
taxpayers who fail to come forward in the voluntary disclosure program risk prosecution and 
substantial fines, as this case demonstrates.’”). 
 35.   CONG. REC. S1746 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“Section 531 
ends shenanigans involving U.S. persons . . . .”). 
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escape U.S. tax enforcement actions due to Swiss secrecy laws that 
continue to conceal their identities.36 
Accordingly, FATCA’s central goal is “rooting out individuals hiding 
their money in bank secrecy jurisdictions.”37  This is to be accomplished by 
imposing new reporting requirements on foreign financial intermediaries 
serving U.S. persons.  Because these foreign financial intermediaries are not 
themselves U.S. persons, FATCA is enforced via a gross basis 30% 
withholding tax on any payment made to any foreign financial institution 
(expansively defined) that does not comply with U.S. reporting 
requirements.38  In broad strokes, compliance involves identifying any 
customer that may be a U.S. person, and either reporting details about their 
financial activities directly to the IRS or closing their accounts.  Failure to 
comply on an ongoing basis will result in 30% withholding of any U.S. 
source payment to the foreign financial institution.39 
FATCA thus contemplates the tracing of virtually every payment of 
U.S. source income to an ultimate owner, with various exceptions involving 
public companies, central banks, and other institutions.40 This imposes 
enhanced information gathering and withholding requirements on virtually 
all payors of U.S. source income, wherever they are located.  It is an 
enormous and ambitious project in terms of data production, gathering, 
filtering, and transmission, as well as in terms of creating the legal means by 
which foreign entities can directly report to the IRS despite domestic 
financial privacy and confidentiality laws that would otherwise obstruct such 
information flows.  As with most legislation, difficult problems arose as the 
IRS and the targeted institutions began to implement the regime and U.S. 
taxpayers began to understand the ramifications of the legislation, especially 
on the over six million U.S. citizens who reside permanently in other 
countries.41  Some of these unresolved difficulties have delayed 
 36.   CONG. REC. S1745 (Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
 37.   Shulman, supra note 30. 
 38.   See I.R.C. § 1471 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-208). 
 39.  See Id. 
 40.   See id. § 1473(3) (entities not subject to withholdable payments include publicly traded 
companies and their affiliated corporations, individual retirement plans and 501(a) organizations, 
U.S. and state agents and their assets, REITs, RICs, and certain exempt trusts). 
 41.   The U.S. Department of State estimates that there are 6.3 million American citizens living 
abroad.  See BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO: CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS BY THE NUMBERS (July 2012), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ca_fact_sheet.pdf.  
These citizens, along with anyone holding a certificate of permanent residency in the U.S. (for whom 
no count is estimated), are experiencing increasingly restricted financial account access in their 
countries of residence.  See, e.g., Americans Residing Overseas Are Denied Bank Accounts, ASS’N 
OF AMS. RESIDENT OVERSEAS, http://aaro.org/denied-bank-accounts (observing that foreign 
financial institutions are closing, threatening to close, or refusing to open accounts for residents with 
U.S. status, even if they are citizens of the country in which they seek to have accounts). 
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implementation, and continue to garner criticism.42  These issues and 
potential avenues to solution are discussed in Part IV, below. 
C.  Empowering Civil Society Through Transparency 
EITI addresses a different but related question involving international 
tax planning and offshore jurisdictions.  The focus of EITI is international 
tax avoidance by multinationals, but not primarily to protect the U.S. tax 
base (although it could certainly have that effect in the future).  Rather, EITI 
is aimed at curbing the potential for U.S. multinationals to engage in or 
facilitate corrupt practices by foreign governments in resource-rich but 
economically poor countries.43 
The roots of the U.S. legislation rest in a global movement that began 
more than a decade ago, when an international resource industry watchdog 
group identified the global under-taxation of multinational companies in the 
extractive sector as a key component of corruption and development failure 
in resource-rich countries.  The group called for transparency as a remedy, to 
be launched and monitored through voluntary participation by governments 
and multinational companies.  EITI grew to encompass a number of 
participants, and led to pressure on governments to adopt “Publish What 
You Pay” (PWYP) principles in line with EITI standards.44 
 42.   See, e.g., Scratched by the FATCA: Congress Creates a Bureaucratic Nightmare for Fund 
Managers, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21540270; David Jolly & 
Brian Knowlton, Law to Find Tax Evaders Denounced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2011,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/business/law-to-find-tax-evaders-denounced.html. 
 43.   See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 110TH CONG., THE PETROLEUM AND 
POVERTY PARADOX: ASSESSING U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO FIGHT THE 
RESOURCE CURSE (Comm. Print Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
110SPRT44727/pdf/CPRT-110SPRT44727.pdf (“Too often, oil money that should go to a nation’s 
poor ends up in the pockets of the rich, or it may be squandered on the trappings of power and 
massive showcase projects instead of being invested productively and equitably.  In some countries, 
national poverty has actually increased following the discovery of oil.  This ‘‘resource curse’’ affects 
us as well as producing countries. It exacerbates global poverty which can be a seedbed for 
terrorism, it dulls the effect of our foreign assistance, it empowers autocrats and dictators, and it can 
crimp world petroleum supplies by breeding instability. . . .  This report argues that transparency in 
revenues, expenditure and wealth management from extractive industries is crucial to defeating the 
resource curse.”); see also Susan Ariel Aaronson, Oil and the Public Interest, VOX (July 12, 2008), 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/can-transparency-extractive-industries-break-resource-curse (“[O]il 
cravings fund and perpetuate undemocratic regimes in many energy-exporting countries. . . .  EITI 
can change the behaviour of oil exporters without conditionality or force.  It empowers reformist 
interests in resource-rich countries and effectively acts as an incentive for oil company executives 
and petro-state policymakers to change their behaviour.”). 
 44.  See Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, 
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/ activities/advocacy/extractive-industries-transparency-initiative 
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Like FATCA, EITI was enacted as an add-on to an unrelated bill after 
failing passage as a stand-alone act.  In this case, the legislation emerged in 
the form of a two-page addendum to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act 
of 2010, a bill aimed at addressing the causes of the financial crisis.45  The 
reform had previously been submitted to Congress in the form of the Energy 
Security through Transparency Act of 2009,46 but failed after extensive 
lobbying by the U.S. oil and gas industry.47  Again, like FATCA, the 
inclusion of EITI in a long, complex, and contested bill ensured its passage 
with relatively little debate and discussion; indeed, commentators suggested 
that the extractive industry was completely caught by surprise when it 
discovered that EITI had passed.48 
The effect of EITI was to revise and expand SEC rules for the disclosure 
of corporate tax payments by targeted companies.  Under the legislation, 
extractive industries would report more information about their global 
corporate structures, intercompany transactions, and payments of any kind of 
tax to all foreign governments.  EITI thus supplemented an existing 
international regime that attempts to prevent corporate bribery of elected 
officials, which is codified in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(FCPA).49  EITI, however, is broader than the FCPA in that the latter was 
intended to end illegal payments of bribes, kickbacks, and the like to 
government officials, while EITI focuses on all payments to foreign 
governments, including legal ones. 
The idea behind EITI is to expose worldwide corporate tax payments for 
two reasons: first, to ensure that the recipient governments are honest with 
their own peoples about revenues under their control; and second, to expose 
the effect of global tax competition on revenues.  The first goal explicitly 
aims at accountability in foreign state governance: the targets are 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 45.   Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (enacted). For the regulations associated with this section see Disclosure of Payments by 
Resource Extraction Issuers, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249 (2010); see also Cardin-Lugar Amendment, 
supra note 3. 
 46.   Energy Security through Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 47.   See Ken Silverstein, As Oil Pours Into Gulf, Oil Industry Fights Anti-Corruption Measure, 
HARPERS (May 11, 2010), http://harpers.org/blog/2010/05/as-oil-pours-into-gulf-oil-industry-fights-
anti-corruption-measure/ (explaining the opposition of the American Petroleum Institute, a trade 
association that represents the U.S. oil and gas industry). 
 48.   See Daniel Firger, Lifting the Resource Curse: Will Dodd-Frank Do the Trick?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-
firger/post_945_b_741761.html; Rebekah J. Poston & Carine M. Williams, ‘Extraction and 
Compliance: New Reporting Requirements for Issues Involving Oil, Natural Gas or Minerals’,  
COMPLINET (Nov. 3, 2010),  http://www.squiresanders.com/files/Publication/0dba74ce-32ba-40f9-
973b-a13fa624b222/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/21d007b3-af8b-4068-9110-1ae23dcf2ed6/ 
Article-Poston_Williams-FCPA-Extraction.pdf. 
 49.   Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). 
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unscrupulous officials who may divert payments meant for national revenues 
to their own private offshore accounts.  The second is an indirect response to 
perceptions among various activist groups that income tax systems of rich 
countries are becoming increasingly generous to multinationals and elites, 
and in turn increasingly burdensome on the working class in societies across 
the globe.50 
As in the case of FATCA, the sponsors and supporters of EITI stated the 
case for corporate tax transparency forcefully and with conviction by casting 
it in terms of U.S. interests.  The argument is that Americans have an interest 
in knowing precisely what our public companies pay in fees, taxes, fines, 
and other payments, to all of the governments of all of the nation-states in 
which they operate.51  Failing to disclose this information on a global basis 
both distorts the decisions of U.S. stakeholders and encourages multinational 
companies to engage in behavior that would not be supported by a knowing 
public. 
The accountability sought in EITI made an important step toward 
corporate tax transparency, but like FATCA, EITI also fell short of its 
potential.  It did so not by being too broad in drawing its target for reform, 
but rather the converse, by restricting itself to one industry, albeit one with 
documented issues of corruption in foreign governance efforts.  EITI has 
demonstrated that American shareholders and a broad range of stakeholders 
have good reasons to want accountability and transparency in the fiscal 
affairs of their public companies, in all sectors.  The arguments made for 
transparency in the extractive sector could and should be marshaled to 
expand EITI to require corporate tax disclosure by all public companies, in 
all industries. 
However, as in the case of FATCA, opponents of corporate tax 
transparency have raised objections that have impeded the implementation 
 50.   See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor? 14 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 24 (2011). 
 51.   See, e.g., Our Activities: United States, PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY,  
http://www.pwypusa.org/our-activities/us (last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (describing the movement in 
support of EITI legislation in the U.S.); Ben German, Sens. Cardin, Lugar Slam Oil Industry’s 
Dodd-Frank Lawsuit, HILL (Oct. 11, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-
wire/261495-sens-cardin-lugar-slam-oil-industry-dodd-frank-lawsuit (“The Cardin-Lugar 
Amendment puts transparency—the key to citizens’ ability to hold their government to account—
ahead of corruption.  To do otherwise is a losing proposition for the United States and company 
shareholders . . . .”); SUSAN SYMONS ET AL., PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS, TAX TRANSPARENCY 
FRAMEWORK: A REVIEW OF THE TAX COMMUNICATIONS OF THE LARGEST LISTED COMPANIES IN 
BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND UK (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.pwc.be/en/publica 
tions/total-tax-framework-pwc-08.pdf. 
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of EITI and may ultimately destroy it, as well as any chance for its future 
expansion.  Immediately after EITI’s passage became news, the oil and gas 
industry in the U.S. engaged in an aggressive campaign to prevent the 
implementation of the law by forestalling the issuance of necessary 
regulations, which were due to be in place by April 17, 201152 but only 
emerged on August 22, 2012.53  Failing to prevent the issuance of those 
regulations, industry representatives filed a lawsuit against the SEC to 
eliminate the law in its entirety.54 The complainants include associations 
whose members have publicly expressed support for EITI as a voluntary 
initiative.55  The issues raised by these opponents and their impact on EITI’s 
 52.   See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1504(2)(A), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-209), (“Information required . . . Not 
later than 270 days after the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, the Commission shall issue final rules . . . .”); Christopher M Matthews, Lawmakers 
Pressure SEC on Dodd-Frank Extractive Provisions, WALL STREET J. BLOG (June 25, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/06/25/lawmakers-pressure-sec-on-dodd-frank-
extractive-provisions/ (“In a letter sent Friday to SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro, 58 lawmakers 
said they were concerned that the Commission had missed the April 17, 2011, statutory deadline for 
the provisions’ final rules.”). 
 53.   See Disclosure of Payment by Resource Extraction Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
67717 (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67717.pdf. 
 54.  Complaint, Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, No. 12-1398 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 10, 2012), available 
at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/sec-and-governance/api-v-sec/ Complain 
t-American-Petroleum-Institute-v-SEC-12-1398-DC-Cir-Oct-10-2012.pdf. 
 55.   For example, ExxonMobil has expressed support for EITI but opposes the Dodd-Frank 
provisions on the grounds they will impede the competitiveness of American companies in the 
global market. See ExxonMobil, About Us: Transparency, EXXONMOBIL.COM, 
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/ about_issues_transparency.aspx  (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) 
(“ExxonMobil has actively participated in Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) since 
its inception in 2002 at both the secretariat and country levels, including continuous participation on 
the EITI board as either a primary or alternate member.  . . .  The Corporation is supporting the 
application, validation, and membership processes of EITI participating countries False”); Ken 
Cohen, Misguided SEC Transparency Rules Only Hurt American Companies, EXXONMOBIL.COM 
(Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.exxonmobilperspectives.com/2012/10/26/misguided-sec-transparency-
rules-only-hurt-american-companies/. Shell has expressed similar support for disclosure in principle.  
See SHELL OIL, ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010, at 7 (2010), available at 
http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2010/servicepages/previous/files/all_shell_sr10.pdf (“In 
the interests of transparency and accountability, we believe in the disclosure of revenues that 
extractive industries pay to host governments.”). Yet Shell, along with ExxonMobil, is a member of 
the American Petroleum Institute, the lead complainant in the EITI lawsuit. Jon Gingerich, The 
Politics of Climate Change, O’DWYER’S MAG, (Feb. 2010), http://www.odwyerpr.com/editorial 
/0201the-politics-of-climate-change.html (“API members include Chevron, ConocoPhillips, 
ExxonMobil, GE, Halliburton and Shell.”); Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness 
Condemns API Lawsuit to Strike Down Dodd-Frank Oil, Gas, and Mining Transparency Provision 
(Oct. 12, 2012), available at, http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-condemns-api-
lawsuit-strike-down-dodd-frank-oil-gas-and-mining-transparency (“API members, especially its 
biggest and most influential players which include Chevron, BP, ExxonMobil and Shell, are using 
API as a front to destroy this law.”). As explanation for these inconsistencies, the American 
Petroleum Institute argues that it is not against disclosure in principle, but opposes “anti-
competitive” regulation.  See Carlton Carroll, API Files Court Challenge Against Costly, Anti-
Competitive SEC Rule, AM. PETROLEUM INST. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.api.org/news-and-
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future are discussed together with those impeding the development of 
FATCA in Part III, below. 
III.  WHAT ROLE FOR THE NATION STATE? 
Having drawn a framework of a world in which states are drawn into 
and at the same time threatened by mercenary behavior, FATCA and EITI 
may seem obviously necessary to protect the claim of the state, as a matter 
of right, to its income tax base.  But, as a threshold matter, we cannot 
identify either mercenary or protective behavior by the state unless we can 
first assert that the state’s claim is appropriately and fairly made.  In other 
words, before we can assess the merits of any tax base-protecting scheme, 
we must make the case that the tax base in question “belongs” in some 
justifiable way to the claiming state.56  Only after staking a defensible claim 
over people and resources can we then determine whether the state’s ability 
to defend its claim is in fact threatened by globalization, and in turn how 
particular legislative reforms assist or hinder that ability. 
A.  Drawing the Boundaries of the Tax State 
One of the enduring problems for those who study international taxation 
from a normative perspective is that states have constantly and consistently 
failed to assert a comprehensively justifiable definition for the taxing 
jurisdiction.57  This is perhaps not surprising when we see that the very 
definition of jurisdiction as applied to the nation-state is a subject of great 
controversy.58  Having failed in the initial definitional endeavor, states 
media/news/newsitems/2012/oct-2012/api-files-court-challenge-against-costly-sec-rule.aspx (“‘The 
oil and natural gas industry strongly supports payment transparency,’ said API President and CEO 
Jack Gerard. ‘We’ve been working hard to increase transparency for a decade, but this rule could 
interfere with ongoing efforts by making U.S. firms less competitive against state owned firms in 
China and Russia that have no interest in transparency.’”). 
 56.   This is a different question from that involving whether taxation is a fundamental aspect of 
nationhood.  That is, even if we decide that the exercise of taxation in general is a fundamental right 
of sovereignty (a debatable proposition), we must still decide that the exercise of taxation in a 
specific case is the right of a specific sovereign. 
 57.   See Christians, supra note 7. 
 58.   See CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5–6 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 
2008) (“[D]efining jurisdiction is hardly self-evident.  What is certain is that jurisdiction somehow 
relates to sovereignty. . . .  Jurisdiction becomes a concern of international law when a State, in its 
eagerness to promote its sovereign interests abroad, adopts laws that govern matters of not purely 
domestic concern. . . .  The law of jurisdiction is doubtless one of the most essential as well as 
controversial fields of international law, in that it determines how far, ratione loci, a State’s laws 
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therefore consistently fail to solve problems caused when assertions made by 
competing states overlap and conflict.59  This is again understandable: 
defining the state’s jurisdiction over resources and people is not by any 
means a straightforward task; moreover, it involves social, political, and 
cultural understandings that defy quantifiable responses.60  The rightful 
claim of the state over revenues (through taxation or otherwise) has been a 
matter of vigorous contest throughout the history of the nation-state.61  
Involving, as it does, an assertion of one jurisdiction as against all others in 
the international society of states, any claim to a superior right to tax seems 
fundamentally incompatible with a world in which people and resources are 
subject to equally compelling claims with little but geopolitical power to 
serve as arbiter.62 
Tax policymakers have tried to address the problem of allocation 
between equally legitimate claims by instituting prioritizing rules, under 
might reach.”); B.J. George, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 
609, 609 (1966) (“[O]ne of the most difficult words in the legal lexicon to delineate is the term 
‘jurisdiction’ . . . .”); Joseph H. Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REV. 241, 
241 (1923) (deNning jurisdiction as “[t]he power of a sovereign to affect the rights of persons, 
whether by legislation, by executive decree, or by the judgment of a court . . . .”); Christopher L. 
Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1109 (1982) (deNning jurisdiction as the authority to affect legal interests); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (“‘Jurisdiction,’ it has been observed, is a word of many, too 
many, meanings’ . . . .”) (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). . 
 59.   See Jack M. Mintz, National Tax Policy and Global Competition, 26 BROOK.  J. INT’L  L. 
1285, 1288 (2001); RYNGAERT, supra note 58, at 3 (describing his theory of “an overarching 
principle of jurisdictional ‘reasonableness’, [that] takes into account the sovereign interests of States 
other than the forum State (i.e., the State exercising its jurisdiction), yet which at the same time 
ensures that the interests of the forum State and of the international community are sufficiently 
heeded. A reasonable exercise of jurisdiction may alleviate the ‘extraterritorial’ impact of 
jurisdictional assertions. . . .”). 
 60.   See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 
56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 817 (1956) (“The boundaries of the tax jurisdiction of the federal 
government are here not limited by any legal lines.  Instead, the assertion of jurisdiction is 
essentially a matter of national policy and national attitudes as to the proper obligations of American 
citizens and corporations in meeting the costs of government.”); Michael S. Kirsch, The Tax Code as 
Nationality Law, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375 (2006) (outlining the various and sometimes conflicting 
rationales for establishing the tax jurisdiction and noting the potential international law violations 
posed by various exertions of the jurisdiction beyond the physical territory of the state). 
 61.   See, e.g., Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
PAPERS (W.F. Stolpher & R.A. Mugrave trans., 1953). 
 62.   See, e.g., RYNGAERT, supra note 58, at 8–9 (“The term ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ is often 
used to condemn the long arm of US law. . . .  The United States are perceived to champion a 
geographically almost unlimited application of their own ‘exceptional’ legislation, a perception 
which is stoked by US unilateralism in world politics. . . .”).  Accordingly, it has been suggested that 
a states’ right to tax is generally accepted as not exclusive but conjunctive.  The principle may be 
embedded in the international law concepts of comity and reciprocity.  See, e.g., F.A. MANN, 
FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1990) (stating that “[s]ince every State enjoys the 
same degree of sovereignty, jurisdiction implies respect for the corresponding rights of other 
States.”). 
12 CHRISTIANS SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/13  9:09 AM 
[Vol. 40: 1373, 2013] Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1391 
which nations voluntarily cede their right to tax to others, according to a 
loosely organized set of standards.  This work began in 1920 with the 
formation of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)—described as 
“the organized private traders of the world,” who took it upon themselves to 
draw up a framework for identifying a “primary” right to tax.63  In 1921, the 
ICC adopted a resolution that the taxing jurisdiction turned on the nature of 
the tax, with distinctions being made between “super” and “normal” taxes.64 
However, the U.S. rejected this resolution and endorsed closer adherence to 
the U.S. system, which assigned jurisdiction on two bases—namely, the 
residence of the taxpayer and the source of the income.65  The U.S. 
prioritized the latter over the former in the case of conflict.66  The ICC 
synthesized the views of the U.S. and fourteen other countries and, in 1923, 
produced a resolution in Rome; later that year, the League of Nations began 
to take over the discussions relating to this issue and used the Rome 
resolutions as a basis for discussion.67  The ICC continued to influence the 
League throughout its work on tax issues,68 and it continues to heavily 
influence the League’s successor body, the OECD, today.69 
Today, the international tax order—if an order exists at all—continues 
to be defined by the principles expressed in the early twentieth century, 
 63.   Dominic Kelly, The International Chamber of Commerce, 10 NEW POL. ECON. 259, 260, 
261 (2005), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/kelly/publications/global_ 
monitor/cnpe114469.pdf. 
 64.   See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONGRESS 9 (1921), 
available at  http://archive.org/download/brochure18inteuoft/brochure18inteuoft.pdf . 
 65.  See Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors and 
Enterprises Abroad, 2 INT’L LAW. 692, 693–94 (1968). 
 66.   See id. 
 67.   For a recitation of this early history of the international tax order see Michael J. Graetz & 
Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021 
(1997). 
 68.   See Kelly, supra note 63, at 261 (“Most noteworthy was the ICC’s involvement with the 
World Economic Conference in May 1927, under the auspices of the League of Nations. . . .  This 
perception of inOuence very quickly became a source of irritation for other non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). For example, the direct representation of the ICC on the Economic 
Consultative Committee of the League of Nations drew the following acerbic response from the 
International Co-operative Alliance in May 1930: ‘Our attention has been drawn to the extraordinary 
claims which have been publicly made that the organized private traders of the world had not only 
succeeded in entrenching themselves at Geneva in the authorities of the League on a basis of 
equality of voice and voting with the National Governments, but wielded such inOuence on behalf of 
their clients—the capitalist private traders—that they practically dominated the situation and were 
even able to repudiate their own National Governments.’”). 
 69.   See Allison Christians, Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
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which reside in an amorphous body of law, quasi-law, and non-law sources 
that often resist clear categorization.70  The quasi-legal, quasi-ordered nature 
of the international tax “regime” has led scholars to embrace pragmatic 
solutions to international conflicts involving residence and source countries, 
and to justify those solutions with various appeals to normative theories.71  
All of the proposed theories have consistently failed to provide a normative 
position that holds up under scrutiny.72  They have similarly failed to explain 
how states actually behave, as opposed to aspirational assertions by 
government officials.73  That has been a loss for international taxation in 
many ways, perhaps not least of which is that it has served to foster 
resignation among scholars to a world of self-serving decision-making by 
states, with virtually no tools for addressing perceived violations of any 
international order.74 
Perhaps the clearest example of the lack of a definable order and the 
concomitant lack of tools to detect or prevent jurisdictional violations arises 
in the assertion by the United States of its tax jurisdiction over U.S. citizens 
and holders of permanent resident status wherever they live.75  This assertion 
of jurisdiction is readily acknowledged to violate the residence principle, 
which is so ubiquitous internationally that it has been called “customary 
 70.   See Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal ‘World Tax Organization’ 
Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 136 (2006); 
Allison Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. J. INT’L L. 325 (2007); 
David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage and the 
“International Tax System”, 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 140–41 (2000); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The David 
R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax System”, 53 TAX L. 
REV. 167, 169 (2000). 
 71.   See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International 
Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1336 (2001); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation 
of International Income, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 148, 169 (1998); Steven A. Dean, More 
Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax 
Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 144 n.79 (2009) (explaining “the Lockean notion that governments 
earn the right to collect tax revenues by providing the services that make the creation of the 
underlying income possible”); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness 
in International Taxation: The Ability-To-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 
299, 307 (2001) (explaining benefits-based arguments). 
 72.   See Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 TAX L. REV. 83 
(2007). 
 73.   See Allison Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case 
Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639 (2005) 
 74.   See Cockfield, supra note 70, at 139. 
 75.   Staking an exclusive claim over a person based on domestic legal status, to the exclusion of 
all other countries, is an example of the American exceptionalism that dominates the general 
jurisprudence on national jurisdiction. See RYNGAERT, supra note 58.  It is further complicated by 
the fact that legal status may be defined for tax purposes in ways that conflict with other domestic 
nationality laws.  See Kirsch, supra note 60, at 377 (“It is now possible for an individual to be 
treated as a citizen for tax purposes during a period when she is not a U.S. citizen under nationality 
law.”). 
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international law.”76  Yet the anomaly persists as an intractable and 
unresolvable feature of the international tax landscape.77 The assertion is 
commonly traced to a U.S. Supreme Court decision, Cook v. Tait,78 which 
asserted that: 
[T]he basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made 
dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being 
in or out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be 
made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being 
in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen 
to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as 
citizen.79 
Because the jurisdictional question has not been resolved 
internationally, there appear to be few means by which any kind of legal 
challenge would stand against virtually any assertion of jurisdiction by the 
U.S.—or, by extension, by any other country that might seek to broaden its 
 76.   See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT’L  389 
(2010); Kaufman, supra note 71, at 148, 169 (arguing that jurisdiction based on residence, and that 
based on source, constitute “customary norms” if not quite customary international law).  
International law scholars typically describe customary law as binding even on those states that had 
no part in forming it, “because they choose to acknowledge its obligatory character.”  INT’L LAW 
ASS’N LONDON CONF., COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 
(2000), available at www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-A61C4CA 
30217F376.  However, there is an exception for so-called “persistent objectors”—those who, before 
a practice develops into a rule of general law, “persistently and openly” dissent from the rule.  Id. at 
27–29.  It is debatable whether that describes the U.S., since its compliance efforts have been 
sporadic in practice.  However, the fact that the practice can be traced in legal form to the income tax 
system of the Civil War in America suggests “persistent and open” dissent from any customary law 
that defines jurisdiction based on residence. 
 77.   Professor Avi-Yonah argues that in addition to failing any normative justification, 
citizenship-based taxation is becoming a nuisance for the U.S. in terms of compliance.  See Avi-
Yonah, supra note 76, at 11 (“The only way we can maintain the fiction that we actually tax most of 
our nonresident citizens is by enacting complicated credit and exclusion provisions that are difficult 
to administer and are frequently ignored in practice.  For someone who acquired US citizenship by 
being born here and has lived almost their entire life overseas, filing tax returns and complying with 
[the Code] must be a highly unlikely proposition even if no tax burden would likely result.  If we did 
not tax nonresident citizens, we could abolish section 911.  We could also abolish IRC section 877, 
which has proven ineffective in deterring tax-motivated expatriations, and simply apply the new IRC 
877A (the exit tax on expatriation) to individuals abandoning US residency, like most countries do. 
Finally, we could give up on the ‘savings clause’ [sic] in our tax treaties, which we insist upon to 
enable us to tax nonresident citizens but which we may well have to pay a price for in treaty 
negotiations.”). 
 78.  265 U.S. 47 (1924) 
 79.   Id. at 56. 
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own jurisdictional reach.80  The best that can be offered for analytical 
purposes is the theory of “jurisdictional reasonableness.”  That theory asserts 
that any basis of jurisdiction asserted by a forum state must “take into 
account the sovereign interests of other states, yet at the same time ensure 
that the interests of the forum state and of the international community are 
sufficiently heeded.”81  The theory draws upon related international law 
concepts, including principles of nonintervention and sovereign equality, 
which try to ensure that states do not use their uneven geopolitical powers to 
assert jurisdiction over affairs under the domain of other states.82  This in 
turn implies that jurisdictional assertions should be studied to ensure they do 
not create the means for economic coercion and intervention.83 
It should be clear that any attempt, using these concepts, to restrict a 
state’s jurisdictional claims would be difficult or impossible to resolve on 
the merits, and that for now at least, geopolitical power remains the only 
explanation for the assertion of tax jurisdiction by states.  This sets the stage 
for thinking about the state as generally unconstrained in any legal sense 
from asserting virtually any jurisdictional reach.  The tax state is thus a 
matter of flexing political muscle, both domestically (in policy decision 
making) and internationally (in implementing policy choices). 
Within this paradigm, any particular state’s reach may be seen as 
 80.   See, e.g., BRIAN J. ARNOLD, TAX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS, NON-RESIDENTS, AND 
FOREIGN ACTIVITIES 7 (1991) (“A country’s legal authority to levy tax is effectively limited only by 
practical considerations of enforcement and collection.  Rules of public international law or domestic 
constitutional law restrict a country’s jurisdiction to tax only in narrow, relatively insignificant 
ways.”); see also SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION 307 (1992) (“From the 
point of view of formal sovereignty, there is no restriction on a state’s right to tax, and it may be 
exercised without regard to its effects on other states.”).  Contra Kirsch, supra note 60, at 389–90, 
407–08 (outlining how the exertion of citizenship-based taxation on persons who are not citizens as 
defined under nationality laws violates both customary international law and the U.S. constitution). 
If exerting citizenship-based taxation is merely a matter of administrative capacity, success in 
implementing the FATCA regime may encourage other countries to follow the U.S. lead. 
 81.   RYNGAERT, supra note 58, at 3; see also Kirsch, supra note 60, at 390–93 (outlining 
traditional bases for jurisdictional assertions and the reasonableness principle). 
 82.   See Robert L. Muse, A Public International Law Critique of the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
of the Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996), 30 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 207, 241–42 (1996–1997) (“Because each nation possesses exclusive 
authority within its territory—but no authority within the territory of another—each nation is co-
equal in rights and status with other nations, regardless of disparities in economic or military 
power.”). 
 83.   See A. Bianchi, Extraterritoriality and Export Controls: Some Remarks on the Alleged 
Antinomy Between European and U.S. Approaches, 35 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 366, 385 (1992) 
(submitting that “principles of jurisdiction need to be studied in connection with other principles 
such as the prohibition of economic coercion and intervention, the consideration of which could be 
useful to set up standards of legitimacy for extraterritorial measures”).  Human rights scholars seem 
to come to similar conclusions in this regard.  For a discussion of views see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 256–57 (2006) (noting 
that even in cases of human rights violation, some of which have been extreme, forcible intervention 
and economic sanction have been used “in a very small number of cases”). 
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justifiable by one state but not another, according to each state’s 
interpretation of prevailing international norms.  Reuven Avi-Yonah has 
argued that what is deemed appropriate changes over time through the 
universal acceptance of practices by key states, especially the United 
States.84  This suggests that the tax state amounts to little more than the 
assertion of its power: what a state should or should not do becomes a 
question of what a state can or cannot do as a matter of administrative 
capacity and relative political might in the international community. 
B.  Is the Tax State Threatened by Globalization and Technological 
Change? 
If we conclude that there are apparently few or no legal limits to the 
taxing jurisdiction of the state, the next question is whether the state is 
otherwise constrained in its reach.  There is no doubt that many or most 
states are so constrained, mainly by the need to follow in the paths set by 
other, more powerful states.85  But some nations are clearly leading the way 
in international taxation.  An important question for these states is therefore 
whether they, too, are constrained to act in the face of economic 
globalization.  This may be framed as a question of whether leader states are 
victims of the global order in which they find themselves, or whether they 
are in fact or could be, if they chose, masters of such order. 
In the international legal literature, the framing of the state as a potential 
victim of globalization is an ongoing theme.  Some authors cast the state as 
an already weak regulatory institution that is steadily weakening against 
globalization, which is in turn seen as an independent overwhelming force 
beyond the control of the state.86  But an opposite view is equally 
propounded that the state is the ultimate architect of globalization and 
therefore inherently capable of exercising control over and within it, 
including over people and their resources.87  International tax scholars seem 
to fall in both camps, but there appears to be more support for the former 
 84.   Avi-Yonah, supra note 76, at 34–37 (outlining key changes in approach to jurisdictional 
reach in the taxation of income earned by United States persons through foreign entities). 
 85.   See Christians, supra note 17; Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal 
Transplantation, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. 
Donahue eds., 2000) 
 86.   See GEORG SØRENSEN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE: BEYOND THE MYTH OF 
RETREAT (2003); HA-JOON CHANG, GLOBALISATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE ROLE OF 
THE STATE (2004). 
 87.   Id. 
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view.88 We seem to have the distinct feeling in the tax community that the 
state is losing its grip over people and resources, that ever more draconian 
measures must be instituted to regain control, but that ultimately the state 
will always fail in the face of creative and determined opposition to its rule.89 
This generally pessimistic view frames the state in its exercise of 
taxation in an essentially defensive position, ultimately failing to keep order 
over people and resources that it should—in principle—control.90  That is the 
idea conveyed by the use of terms like “erosion” to describe how planning 
strategies undertaken by millions of individual actors, including—but not 
limited to—tax evasion, impact the tax system as a whole.91  The challenge 
for international tax law is to define the people and resources over which the 
state can and should exercise control, in order to justify measures taken to 
defend that right. 
One response is that the U.S. jurisdiction to tax is curtailed by 
globalization, because its citizens undertake transactions and activities in 
places, and sometimes move themselves to places, that are beyond the reach 
of the U.S. tax authority.  That has been a common theme of tax scholarship 
that predicts the erosion of the fiscal state due to avoidance and evasion by 
taxpayers.92  Certainly, ample evidence in support of the proposition can be 
marshaled from academic and media coverage of what now appears to be a 
rampant epidemic of tax dodging by U.S. multinationals and wealthy 
individuals.93 
But both FATCA and EITI seriously undermine the notion that the U.S. 
is threatened by globalization and technological change.  Each regime, in 
different ways, is an assertion by the U.S. that it not only has the 
jurisdictional authority to trace its resources no matter where in the world 
they are located, but that it also has the capacity to do so.  If these assertions 
are correct, then it cannot be said that the U.S. is defeated by globalization or 
technological change as a matter of either legal reach or practical capacity, 
 88.   See Phillip Genschel, Globalization and the Transformation of the Tax State, 13 EUROPEAN 
REV. 53 (2005). 
 89.   See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International 
Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335, 1349 (2001) (arguing that states are losing control over 
corporations and that this “will compel the transfer of national responsibility for the corporation 
income tax to an international authority”). 
 90.  See Robert T. Kurdle & Lorraine Eden, The Campaign Against Tax Havens: Will it Last? 
Will it Work?, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 37, 66–68 (2003–2004). 
 91.   See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT 
SHIFTING (2013). 
 92.   For a seminal argument see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the 
Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000). 
 93.  See, e.g., Allison Christians, Tax Activists and the Global Movement for Development 
Through Transparency 15 n.70 (Univ. of Wis. Tax Law & Dev. Legal Studies Paper Series, Paper 
No. 1193, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029055. 
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but rather that in the past it has simply not exercised the full measure of its 
ability to regulate.94  FATCA and EITI thus stand as evidence that the 
decision of the state not to regulate—in the case of any state with 
administrative capacity similar to that of the U.S.—must be attributed to 
political choice rather than capacity.95 
Under this rubric, FATCA and EITI introduce a new role for the state in 
directly regulating people and institutions that are not necessarily within its 
jurisdiction as traditionally understood.  In the case of FATCA, the 
perceived threat is that financial institutions, if left to their own devices, will 
engage in tax base-eroding practices rather than tax base-protecting ones, 
and that the only way to protect the tax base is to expand the state’s 
oversight to any entity that provides services to people who are supposed to 
be included in the tax base.  Fishing expeditions, in the past dismissed as 
inappropriate by the OECD,96 are the mainstay of this regime.97  In the case 
of EITI, the target is U.S. multinationals with respect to their tax 
relationships with foreign governments, and the perceived threat is that U.S. 
companies will take advantage of weak foreign laws and lawmakers to 
unfairly exploit people and resources in other countries in the absence of 
external intervention.98 
Both FATCA and EITI may be seen as expansionary policies, 
broadening the nation-state’s regulatory jurisdiction in the face of its feared 
decline under the twin pressures of globalization and technological 
advancement.99  This is a significant development in the global tax order 
 94.   One explanation for this may be that in the past, blanket account surveillance of a citizenry 
would have been viewed as an unwarranted intrusion by the state.  For example, the OECD clearly 
and repeatedly proclaimed that it never intended the harmful tax practices project to sanction or 
enable states to embark on “fishing expeditions.”  OECD, HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES, supra note 8, 
at 10.  Yet it has long been clear that sophisticated fishing expeditions would be the only way for 
states to curb tax evasion, since “without them, the chance of an evader getting caught will likely 
remain modest.”  Robert Kudrle, The OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition Initiative and the Tax 
Havens: From Bombshell to Damp Squib, 8 GLOBAL ECON. J. 1, 89 (2008). 
 95.   See HA-JOON CHANG, supra note 86. 
 96.   See Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, OECD 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxtreaties/article26oftheoecdmodeltaxconventiononincomeandcapital.htm 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (“Countries are not at liberty to engage in ‘fishing expeditions’ or to 
request information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer.”). 
 97.  Id.  (amending the language of the article to require states to “exchange such information as 
is foreseeably relevant”). 
 98.  See Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource 
Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 785, 828–29 (2012). 
 99.  See Susan C. Morse, Taxation of Offshore Accounts: Ask For Help, Uncle Sam: The Future 
of Global Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529, 531–32 (2012) (“FATCA is a new solution to the 
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given dire predictions about the continued efficacy of the state, bounded by 
its territorial reach and administrative capacity, in regulating the affairs of 
people and resources that are not so bounded.100  Most international tax 
scholarship continues to suggest that states cannot act unilaterally to achieve 
tax goals on a global basis due to legal and administrative barriers—that 
cooperation is necessary to implement a comprehensive income tax base.101  
But FATCA and EITI demonstrate that the U.S. (at least) has the capacity to 
regulate people and resources to an extent that may have seemed 
unimaginable not too long ago.102  The conclusion is that contrary to 
conventional wisdom, a single state can in fact enforce a comprehensive, 
worldwide income tax system. 
C.  How FATCA and EITI Re-Assert the U.S. Tax Jurisdiction 
In the case of FATCA, the expansion of the U.S. regulatory jurisdiction 
is being accomplished over both its own taxpayers and all the financial 
institutions in the world that may serve them.103  The mechanism involves 
new reporting and withholding provisions that apply directly to any 
purveyor of U.S. source income to any U.S. person, wherever either such 
party may be, anywhere in the world.104  This is both a rather startling 
revelation of the U.S. capacity to manage data and an explicit rejection of 
the century-old international practice of state-to-state information gathering 
and exchange on a bilateral and, more recently, multilateral basis.  It is also a 
rejection of foreign financial privacy and confidentiality laws that prevent 
financial institutions from disclosing information about clients and 
customers beyond their own governments.105 
The information-sharing regime has been slow to evolve and subject to 
much criticism for its continued tolerance of privacy regimes that aid and 
abet tax evasion around the world.106  The United States has taken 
inconsistent positions on both financial privacy and the multilateral approach 
to information sharing.107  This is evidenced by its initial contribution and 
old problem of U.S. domestic taxpayers evading tax on their income from offshore accounts.”). 
 100.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 101.  See Morse, supra note 99, at 542 (“U.S. tax administrators can improve the chances of 
FATCA’s success by seeking the cooperation and involvement of non-U.S. governments.”). 
 102.  See Miranda supra note 98, at 828–29. 
 103.  Morse, supra note 99, at 536–37. 
 104.  See id. 
 105.   See e.g., Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 
(Can.); Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (U.K.). 
 106.  See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.29–42 and accompanying text. 
 107.  See, e.g., Robert Kurdle, The OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition Initiative and the Tax 
Havens: From Bombshell to Damp Squib, 8 GLOBAL ECON. J. 1, 1–18 (2008) (describing shifts in 
OECD approach and U.S. reaction to the harmful tax practices project as it evolved). 
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later outright rejection of OECD developments on the matter.108  It is also 
evidenced by the long-standing practice of shielding U.S.-based information 
that would help other countries enforce their own tax laws.  When scandals 
like UBS exposed the cooperative approach to information gathering and 
exchange as a charade, FATCA may well have been viewed as the only 
rational response to a public outraged by a relentless parade of international 
tax evasion perpetuated by society’s wealthiest members.109 
EITI’s expansion of corporate regulation presents another important 
break from tradition.110  In supporting greater transparency of the foreign 
fiscal affairs of U.S. multinationals in the resource extraction sector, EITI’s 
supporters have argued that corporate shareholders are interested in knowing 
what U.S. companies pay in taxes to other governments on a country-by-
country and even project-by-project basis.111  Stakeholders currently lack 
access to this information due to existing rules that either safeguard the 
confidentiality of tax information or otherwise introduce complexity in ways 
that impede assessment of a company’s financial situation even when 
information is publicly available.112  The confidentiality and complexity to 
be overcome lies in legal disclosure standards that require multinationals to 
publish only limited and piecemeal information about their operations.113  
Furthermore, no one country requires multinationals to provide a globally 
comprehensive picture of their geographic operations, inter-company 
transfers, or tax payments.114  As a result, multinationals use various 
complex financial strategies and multijurisdictional structures to locate profit 
in ways that are often difficult (practically or politically) for their home or 
 108.   See id. 
 109.   See McIntyre, supra note 11, at 255. 
 110.   But in this case, it is not a long tradition.  There is precedent for disclosure of at least some 
tax details in the United States, historically at the federal level but also based upon state practice. 
Nationally, the public has had varying levels of access to tax information throughout U.S. history, 
with current standards of confidentiality being the most restrictive.  See Christians, supra note 93. 
 111.   See Henry Lazenby, New SEC Rules Should Become International Standard—PWYP 
Coalition, MINING WKLY. (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.miningweekly.com/article/new-
sec-rules-should-become-international-standard-pwyp-coalition-2012-08-23 (quoting a sustainability 
analyst for an extractive industries investment company as saying “[w]e would be able to better 
value companies if they are forced to be more transparent about their dealings . . . .”). 
 112.   See Allison Christians, Do We Need to Know More About Our Public Companies?, 66 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 843, 843–44 (2012). 
 113.   See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 762–70 (2011). 
 114.   See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Insight: Microsoft Use of Low-Tax Havens Drives Down Tax 
Bill, REUTERS (July 27, 2011, 7:07 PM), www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-microsoft-tax-
idUSTRE76Q6OB20110727.. 
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headquarters countries to track, and all but impossible for the public to 
monitor or understand.115 
In this manner EITI, like FATCA, introduces a jurisdictional claim for 
the state that collides with existing confidentiality and privacy laws.  In this 
case, the laws in question do not shield the taxpayer from the state—if they 
so chose, states could already extract all of the EITI-related information 
from public companies as part of their annual tax reporting requirements.  
Instead, the privacy in question shields the global tax-planning activities of 
multinational companies from the view of the public.116  The legal question 
is whether this kind of information constitutes “[p]ublic business [that] is the 
public’s business,” as to which the public has “the right to know.”117  The 
passage of EITI answers this question in the affirmative, and therefore—
again in the same vein as FATCA—casts the state in the role of global 
information extractor for the benefit of the public.118  In this case, the benefit 
to the public is achieving information symmetry for market participants 
instead of extracting revenues from would-be tax evaders. 
EITI also breaks from a perhaps little-known national competitiveness 
tradition that resides in the technical rules of the foreign tax credit regime.  
The Treasury has explicitly commanded U.S. companies to attempt to 
minimize their taxes in foreign countries; in fact, such attempts comprise a 
condition of eligibility for foreign tax credits.119  This makes sense in terms 
 115.   See RICHARD MURPHY, TASK FORCE ON FIN. INTEGRITY & ECON. DEV., COUNTRY BY 
COUNTRY REPORTING: HOLDING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS TO ACCOUNT WHEREVER THEY 
ARE (June 2009), available at www.financialtaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Final_CbyC 
_Report_Published.pdf. 
 116.   In the United States, for example, tax information is protected pursuant to federal statute, 
with high penalties for disclosure.  See I.R.C. § 6103 (2006). Canada has a similar rule.  See Income 
Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, §§ 239(2.2), 241 (5th Supp.) (Can.).  Certain persons who are deemed to 
have a ‘material interest’ in a specific taxpayer’s return, such as, in the case of corporations, “any 
bona fide shareholder of record owning 1 percent or more of the outstanding stock of such 
corporation,” are entitled to obtain such returns.  See I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1)(D)(iii). Public disclosure of 
any information obtained under this exception is prohibited, even if lawfully obtained by the 
shareholder. The prohibition cannot be overcome by freedom of information requests.  See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(3) (2006) (articulating an exception from the Freedom of Information Act disclosure for 
information otherwise protected by statute).  See I.R.C. § 6103(a)(1).  Placing reporting requirements 
under securities compliance rules rather than within the tax code overcomes this problem.  See, e.g., 
STEVEN MARK LEVY, How the FBAR is Used, in FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS, 
BANKING, CORPORATE AND SECURITIES COMPLIANCE ch. 10.04 (rev. ed. 2011). 
 117.   Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the 
Pursuit of a Visible State 19 (Jan. 9, 2012) (unpublished), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1918154. 
 118.  See supra Part III.C. 
 119.   See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1116, at 2 (2012), available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1116.pdf (“Taxes paid to a foreign country that you do not legally 
owe, including amounts eligible for refund by the foreign country.  If you do not exercise your 
available remedies to reduce the amount of foreign tax to what you legally owe, a credit for the 
excess amount is not allowed.”). 
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of revenue prorection since, by virtue of the foreign tax credit, the U.S. 
collects tax only on a residual basis with respect to foreign source income 
earned by U.S. persons.120  The residence-based tax the U.S. can collect on 
such foreign source income is maximized to the extent the taxpayer 
minimizes the source-based tax collected by the host government.  This 
observation suggests that U.S. companies and the U.S. government are 
aligned in their focus to avoid paying tax to a foreign government whenever 
possible.121 
EITI changes that assumption by suggesting that the U.S. government 
has a role in ensuring that U.S. multinationals pay an appropriate amount of 
tax to the foreign countries in which they do business.122  What that 
appropriate amount may be is hotly contested and is sure to become more so 
once greater public disclosure takes place.123  But the underlying premise of 
EITI is that market decisions depend on globally comprehensive reporting 
and disclosure of the tax planning decisions undertaken by multinationals 
and, importantly, that the state has a duty to extract such information from 
its multinationals.124  Under EITI, the state will exercise that right by 
requiring any specified company listed on a U.S. exchange to compile and 
disclose extensive information about its inter-company agreements, 
transactions, and payments, as well as payments by any of the companies in 
the multinational group to any foreign government.125  Like FATCA, the 
passage of EITI demonstrates that states not only have the right to extract 
this kind of information, but that they have the duty to do so, and, in the U.S. 
at least, that they have the capacity to do so.126 
 120.  Id. (noting that the U.S. government gives tax credits to corporations paying taxes to foreign 
governments). 
 121.   Of course, the company facing residence-based taxation is indifferent with respect to which 
country collects what portion of a tax.  But by limiting access to foreign tax credits on the basis of 
efforts to reduce tax in the source country, the U.S. aligns its multinationals with its own goal of 
minimizing source-based tax.  See id. 
 122.  Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 123.   This information-enabled public discourse is a source of worry for multinational company 
managers and advisors, who fear that the public is likely to misunderstand the disclosed information.  
See, e.g., William Morris, Taxation and Development: Is Country-by-Country Reporting the 
Answer?, OECD OBSERVER (Mar. 2010), http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3229/ 
Taxation_and_development.html. 
 124.   See, e.g., MABEL VAN ORANJE & HENRY PARHAM, PUBLISHING WHAT WE LEARNED: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY COALITION (2009),  available at 
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/sites/pwypdev.gn.apc.org/files/Publishing%20What%20We%20
Learned%20-%20EN.pdf. 
 125.   See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 249 (2012). 
 126.  17 C.F.R. § 229.101. 
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Perhaps the most important takeaway regarding the ability of legislators 
to reassert a strong role for the state within the context of a global economic 
system of its own making is that “[a]n indispensable step toward a truly 
comprehensive system of world order is to disabuse all minds of the false 
myth that universal words imply universal deeds.”127  The authors of those 
words, the venerable scholars Myers McDougall128 and Harold Lasswell,129 
sought a universal international law of human dignity, but it is not too much 
of a stretch to fit the state’s assertion of tax on people within that rubric.  It 
is one thing to say that a particular regime is designed to lead to a 
multilateral order that features fair treatment for all stakeholders, whether 
that means safeguarding the tax base or eliminating information asymmetry 
in the marketplace.  Quite obviously, implementation will be the key, and, in 
that measure, there is unfortunately reason for doubt. 
Of particular note for the proponents of FATCA and EITI, along with 
any other regime that seeks to bring governments together in a concerted 
effort towards justice or fairness, is the recognition that law requires broad 
cooperation in order to work, and that is no less true in the international 
arena than in the domestic one.  Thus, “[t]he effective authority of any legal 
system depends in the long run upon the underlying common interests of the 
participants in the system and their recognition of such common interests, 
reflected in continuing predispositions to support the prescriptions and the 
procedures that comprise the system.”130  FATCA and EITI face major 
challenges in identifying such common interests and engendering 
recognition of all stakeholders in carrying out the contemplated reforms.  
These challenges are described in the next section.  
IV.  PUTTING THE REIGN BACK IN SOVEREIGN 
FATCA and EITI are poised to reactivate the nation state in its quest to 
protect the global fiscal order through comprehensive regulatory action.  
 127.   Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse 
Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 4–5 (1959). 
 128.   McDougall may be relatively unknown among the tax community, but his work on 
international law and his contribution to the New Haven School of Jurisprudence earned him 
worldwide recognition as an eminent expert on the rule and the role of law, and he had much to say 
that would resonate especially among international tax scholars.  See Michael Reisman, Myres S. 
McDougal: Architect of a Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 66 MISS. L.J. 15 (1996). 
 129.   While also likely unknown to tax scholars, Professor Lasswell was a professor of political 
science and later law who studied the intersections of personality, economy, society, and politics and 
has been referred to as “the most original and productive political scientist of his time.”  See Gabriel 
A. Almond, Harold Dwight Lasswell: 1902–1978, in BIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIRS 249, 249 (Nat’l 
Acad. of Scis. ed., 1987), available at http://www.nasonline.org/publications/biographical-
memoirs/memoir-pdfs/lasswell-harold.pdf. 
 130.   McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 127, at 4–5. 
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This would be a positive development for international tax; it suggests that 
the nation-state is not threatened, but rather is empowered by globalization 
and technological advancement to reassert its right and its ability to rule.  
This further indicates that the current unraveling of income taxation that 
appears to be occurring all over the world could be reversed through 
stronger, broader, and more effective regulation. In other words, the claim is 
that political will alone stands in the way of a coherent and fair global tax 
system.  Unfortunately, both FATCA and EITI have fallen short of their 
potential in ways that must be addressed if the ultimate goal is to be 
achieved. 
A.  FATCA: Two Failures, Two Fixes 
FATCA has fallen short of its potential in two ways.  It has done so first 
by violating strongly held perceptions about what a single state can and 
should do as a member of international society, thereby exposing the U.S. to 
global criticism and resistance, even from observers who agree with its 
underlying goals.  Much of the criticism is legitimate and could be resolved, 
but resolution will not undo the reputational damage to the rule of law.  
Second, and more damaging in the long run, FATCA has violated the 
cooperative model and—even though its aspirations are global—the 
legislation seems poised to create a world of cooperation among rich, 
developed countries while excluding and isolating all others, particularly 
those countries most fiscally vulnerable to tax evasion.131 
The first failure is serious, but it is at least in part reversible.  One 
articulation of the problem in international law terms is that FATCA has 
failed the jurisdictional reasonableness test by claiming that the U.S. a right 
to regulate while failing to account adequately for the equal right of other 
countries to set and enforce their own laws, including consumer banking and 
privacy laws.132  This has created resistance in the international community, 
 131.   See, e.g., Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2001–2010: Overview, 
GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2012/2012report.html (last visited Mar. 19, 
2013) (“The developing world lost US$859 billion in illicit outflows in 2010, an increase of 11% 
over 2009.  The capital outflows stem from crime, corruption, tax evasion, and other illicit 
activity.”). 
 132.   See Melissa A. Dizdarevic, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going Where No 
Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2969 (2011) (describing how the IRS 
has depended on voluntary information reporting and the use of withholding taxes to ensure that 
income is collected); Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion, TAX NOTES, Apr. 20, 2009, at 264–
68 (explaining how the IRS uses a Qualified Intermediary program under which foreign banks that 
receive payments certify the nationality of their depositors and reveal the identity of any American 
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especially in cases involving U.S. persons’ access to basic banking services 
in jurisdictions in which they reside permanently and which are not “bank 
secrecy jurisdictions” under any standard definition, and so cannot be easily 
cast as perpetrators of violations against the U.S.133  The focus on this issue 
is impeding the development of FATCA as a first step toward a multilateral 
regime of automatic information sharing as its proponents envisioned 
creating.134  The U.S. has responded to the problem of domestic law 
interference by introducing intergovernmental agreements (IGAs).  But 
IGAs raise additional unanswered questions of legal procedure that are 
significant rule of law questions in their own right. 
For example, from the U.S. perspective, the intergovernmental 
agreements that have been proposed and entered into are presumably created 
under an existing tax treaty authorization which allows the competent 
authorities “to clarify or interpret” existing treaty and tax information 
exchange agreement provisions.135  In other words, the Treasury appears to 
be presenting these instruments as diplomatic agreements to carry out 
existing treaty policies.  If this is the case, it represents a significant 
expansion of the competent authority’s interpretive role, possibly beyond 
anyone’s current conception and certainly beyond the intent of any of the 
signatories to any U.S. treaties currently in force.  Moreover, this 
unprecedented expansion is occurring with no discussion of its legal 
framework by the Treasury. 
Yet we may speculate that these agreements are competent authority 
agreements only as a matter of ruling out the alternatives, since the 
agreements themselves carry no indicia of their legal pedigree and none has 
been officially offered.  Certainly, the agreements are not being undertaken 
in a manner typical for competent authority agreements.  The major 
characteristic of a competent authority agreement is that it can be finalized 
citizens using their banking services). 
 133.   This is particularly troublesome for Americans who reside abroad, for whom FATCA 
legislation may be obstructing their access to bank accounts, insurance coverage, and pension plans.  
Brian Knowlton, More American Expatriates Give Up Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/us/26expat.html. For citizens in high-tax countries who will not 
owe tax to the U.S. in most cases, compliance with the U.S. tax jurisdiction poses nothing more than 
an expensive nuisance, so FATCA seems an additional unwarranted imposition.  This may be why, 
in Senator Levin’s Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, the focus of reform was placed on a list of targeted 
jurisdictions, rather than all foreign countries.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  This 
accords with the OECD approach, which, while deeply flawed, tried to cast its approach as a 
defensive, rather than an aggressive, measure, aimed at nations in which taxpayers would be subject 
to little or no taxation.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,  supra note 8. 
 134.  See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 135.   See, e.g., UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION art. 26 (Nov. 15, 2006),  
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801.pdf; ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, at M-62 to 
M-65 (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxtreaties/47213736/pdf. 
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by the competent authorities of treaty signatories without any ratification 
procedures by either government, under the terms of the treaty.136  Hundreds, 
perhaps even thousands, of competent agreements are entered into every 
year on that basis.137  This clearly has not been the understanding of most of 
the IGA signatories to date: with the exception of Mexico, each is pursuing 
internal ratification procedures.138 
Moreover, as a technical matter, it is difficult to see how these IGAs 
could be competent authority agreements.  First, none are formally described 
as such by their terms, in contrast to other competent authority agreements, 
which are consistently so described.139  Second, it appears that these 
agreements are not being signed by competent authorities: in at least one 
case, an agreement was signed by a U.S. embassy member rather than a 
competent authority, while the identities of the signatories of other 
agreements have not been made public.140  Both of these are technical 
 136.  The product of competent authority resolution may take one of two forms: a taxpayer-
specific competent authority agreement or a non-taxpayer-specific, generalized competent authority 
agreement.  See Competent Authority Agreements, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-
Taxpayers/Competent-Authority-Agreements (last updated Mar. 19, 2013).  The former is an agreed-
upon decision on an individual case; the latter is a generalized statement, typically characterized as 
procedural, and is meant to “clarify or interpret treaty provisions.”  Id.  The former consists of 
unpublished agreements that are applied only to the individual taxpayers in resolution of their cases, 
while the latter results in public documents meant to be relied upon by other taxpayers.  Most 
competent authority agreements are specific rather than general; general agreements are published in 
the U.S. in the Internal Revenue Bulletin and online. See Internal Revenue Bulletin, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 137.   See supra note 136. 
 138.   See, e.g., Baker & MacKenzie, Client Alert: United States and Mexico FATCA 
Intergovernmental Agreement: Effective January 1st, 2013, (Jan., 2013), in 2013 TAX ANALYSTS 
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 12–20 (2013) (“Upon a number of consultations with the relevant tax 
authorities, we have concluded that no need exists for the United States and Mexico FATCA 
Intergovernmental Agreement to be published in the Mexican Federal Official Gazette in order for it 
to be effective.”); Agreement Between the Department of Treasury of the United States of America 
and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of the United Mexican States to Improve International 
Tax Compliance Including with Respect to FATCA, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 19, 2012, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-
Mexico-11-19-2012.pdf 
 139.   See Competent Authority Agreements, supra note 136.  All of the agreements posted on this 
site are referred to as competent authority agreements by their terms, and all are signed by persons 
who are named therein as the competent authorities of their respective states. The U.S.-Mexico 
intergovernmental agreement is notably missing from this site even though it is currently in force.  
Id. 
 140.   Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the United States of America to Improve International Tax 
Compliance and to Implement FATCA, U.S.-U.K., Sept. 12, 2012, available at http://www.hm 
treasury.gov.uk/d/facta_agreement_tax_compliance_140912.pdf (signed by David Gauke on behalf 
of “The Government of the United States” and by Barbara Stephenson “For the Government of the 
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matters that may seem trivial on the surface, but they open up IGAs to 
scrutiny because they do not accord with the usual practice for international 
tax agreements, a practice from which the U.S. has not deviated for almost a 
century. 
This brings the IGAs into murky status under U.S. law, as it seems that 
no internal legislative procedure will be undertaken to enact these 
international agreements in the U.S.—they appear to await only internal 
ratification by FATCA partners.  If so, the agreements represent another 
unprecedented first in the history of U.S. tax law and tax treaty making: they 
appear to introduce a new category of sole executive agreements on taxation, 
not pre-authorized by congress, not expressly authorized by any existing 
treaty, and serving to override existing statutory tax law without any 
congressional oversight at all.141  The rule of law implications of this kind of 
muddled approach to what appears to be an ambitious assertion of the U.S. 
tax jurisdiction is highly problematic. 
A second articulation of the rule of law problem is that FATCA unearths 
and harshly highlights an existing but perhaps little-noticed jurisdictional 
reasonability failure by the U.S., namely its practice of citizenship-based 
taxation.  Since the violation of the residence principle by status-based 
jurisdictional assertions has long been clear, FATCA emerges as an 
economic sanction to enforce an order that, now under a spotlight, many 
view as indefensible in principle.142  Statutorily, this sanction is imposed on 
foreign institutions, but the impact is that U.S. persons living in other 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland”).  Barbara Stephenson is a U.S. Minister at 
the United States Embassy in London.  See Barbara J. Stephenson, EMBASSY OF UNITED STATES 
LONDON U.K.,  http://london.usembassy.gov/ukdcm.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).  It may be 
possible for the U.S. competent authority, currently Michael Danilack, to deputize the Minister to 
act, but there is no record of such deputization and there appear to be no other competent authority 
agreements signed by her on behalf of the U.S. competent authority.  The most recent competent 
authority agreements have been signed by Michael Danilack. See, e.g., Competent Authority 
Agreement, U.S.-Nor., Nov., 2012, available at http://www.irs.gov/PUP/individuals/international/ 
USNorwaySourceofremunerationforgovernmentservicesandsocialsecuritypaymentsDecember2012.p
df; Competent Authority Agreement, U.S.-Neth, May 21, 2012, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/dutch_lfma_map.pdf; Competent Authority Agreement, U.S.-Ger., 
Mar. 19, 2012, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/german_pension_fund_map_2012.pdf.. 
 141.   None of this necessarily impacts the legal force of the IGAs from an international 
perspective.  In the eyes of the world, these may be viewed as equivalent to any other international 
agreement. 
 142.   See, e.g., Bishnodat Persaud, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Policy: A Major Issue 
for Small States, in INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION: GLOBALISATION AND FISCAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 17, 19 (Rajiv Biswas ed., 2002) (“Defensive measures . . . are a polite usage for 
sanctions . . . .”).  The imposition of a sanction is a serious matter in international law and generally 
requires clear justification.  Scholars debate, for example, what level of violation of human life or 
dignity should be tolerated before one state should intervene militarily to restore order or save lives.  
For a discussion of views see NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 256–57 (noting that even in cases of 
human rights violation, some of which have been extreme, forcible intervention and economic 
sanction have been used “in a very small number of cases”). 
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countries may now be viewed as a burden for foreign institutions who find it 
more expedient to deny them basic account services—even when there is no 
evidence of tax fraud or criminal activity—than to face the high cost of 
compliance with U.S. law.143 
Predictably, this has given rise to vociferous objection from parties who 
may not themselves even be subject to FATCA or its related reporting 
requirements, but who see the interaction of FATCA and citizenship-based 
taxation as an unnecessary affront to human mobility as well as a violation 
of important international norms.144  In international law terms, FATCA’s 
enforcement of citizenship-based taxation appears to violate the duty of the 
U.S. to “take into account the sovereign interests of other states, yet at the 
same time ensure that the interests of the forum State and of the international 
community are sufficiently heeded.”145 The violation arises because it 
involves pursuing people who live, work, and pay taxes in other countries 
based on their ongoing status as citizens or green card holders in the U.S., 
even if they also hold citizenship in the country of their residence.146  Many 
such dual or multiple citizens may have lived for years, decades, and even 
lifetimes without understanding their ongoing obligations to the U.S.; some 
may not even have realized they had such status, because they may have 
mistakenly believed that citizenship required their affirmative consent or 
pursuit.147 
There are some fairly straightforward solutions to the citizenship-based 
jurisdictional reasonability problem, but they would require a political 
appetite for tax reform that may be lacking in the U.S.  One solution is to 
 143.  Under the statute, foreign financial institutions have three choices with respect to accounts 
held by persons with U.S. status: pay the increased cost of compliance with U.S. law, pay the cost of 
withholding on U.S. investments, or divest from the U.S. market. See FATCA Deadline Looms for 
International Banks, EUROMONEY (Aug. 2012),  http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3067431/ 
Fatca-deadline-looms-for-international-banks.html.  Media reports suggest that financial institutions 
appear to view ridding themselves of U.S. customers as a fourth option, even though simply having 
no U.S. customers does not exempt them from demonstrating their compliance.  See Robert W. 
Wood, Americans Become Undesirable as FATCA Closes More Doors, FORBES, Oct. 25, 2012, 
available at  http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/10/25/americans-are-undesirable-as-
fatca-closes-more-doors/ (“[T]hese days, anyone but Americans seems likely to be welcomed into 
foreign banks. Welcome to FATCA, the global U.S. law that applies in earnest in 2013.  Americans 
everywhere are facing ostracism and some are voting with their feet.”). 
 144.  See, e.g., RYNGAERT, supra note 58, at 3. 
 145.   Id. 
 146.  See id. 
 147.   See U.S. Dep’t of State, US State Services Dual Nationality, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, 
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (“Persons may 
have dual nationality by automatic operation of different laws rather than by choice.”). 
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reverse course incrementally by either exempting any assets or accounts held 
in the same country as the owner’s residence, defined for these purposes 
under the international standard (such as that encompassed in the OECD 
Model tax convention).148  That does not relieve the compliance burden of 
foreign institutions, but it does remove some of the stigma created by 
highlighting citizenship taxation via an already controversial expansion of 
the U.S. tax jurisdiction.149  A related incremental step would be to move in 
the direction of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act by creating a “high tax 
country” kickout of sorts, which would exempt listed jurisdictions from 
FATCA.  The U.S. Treasury has already stated that it will not consider such 
a move, so there are high political barriers to this solution even though it 
would accord with past international practice (not to mention the plain 
language of the statute).150  Both of these incremental steps would move the 
U.S. closer to the residence standards embraced by other countries, including 
all of its developed country peers, and relieve some of the opposition to 
FATCA. 
The rule of law questions raised by FATCA are thus solvable in theory, 
but perhaps even more problematic to FATCA’s development is that this 
reform has fallen far short of its potential by failing to enact the legislation 
to ensure reciprocity in information gathering and exchange by the U.S. 
itself.151  This has the potential to be a much more serious problem in the 
long run, because it proposes a turn away from multilateralism and toward a 
world in which developed countries can and will take what they want from 
poor countries under the guise of leveling a playing field which is already 
heavily skewed toward the global north.  In this case, information and 
capital will flow from poor countries to the U.S. without any information 
flowing in the opposite direction.  Unlike the other issues raised by FATCA, 
the path to multilateralism and the commodification of information cannot 
be reversed by unilateral action on the part of the U.S. 
This violation occurs because the statutory FATCA regime is a one-way 
information street, the currently proposed solution to that one-way street is 
an only partially two-way street, and even that partial solution will be denied 
to most poor countries.  FATCA is a one-way street because it only extracts 
information from foreign financial institutions: though the IRS will enter 
 148.   See Allison Christians, Could a Same-Country Exception Help Focus FATCA and FBAR?, 
66 TAX NOTES INT’L 157 (2012). 
 149.  Id. at 159. 
 150.   See John McCrank, Update 1—Canada Hopes for Exemption on US FATCA Rules: Treasury 
Says Not Considering Exemption for Canada, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2011, 5:13 PM), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/canada-usa-taxes-idUSN1E7941R120111005. 
 151.  See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act §§ 501–531,  Pub..L. No. 111–147,  124 
Stat. 71 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
PLAW-111publ147/pdf/PLAW-111publ147.pdf. 
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into “agreements” with these institutions, there is clearly no quid pro quo 
from the U.S. to the foreign financial institutions or their home countries.152  
FATCA’s partial two-way street emerges in the IGAs, but these are not 
genuinely two-way since the information they extract from other 
governments is far more expansive than the information the U.S. is willing 
to require its own institutions to disclose for the benefit of foreign 
governments.153  The IGAs contain aspirational language suggesting that the 
U.S. is committed to seeking reciprocity at some future point.154  But at 
present, the best a foreign country can hope for in terms of additional 
information from the U.S. is its addition to a list of countries with which the 
U.S. will exchange portfolio interest-related information on an automatic 
basis.155  There is only one country currently on that list—Canada—and that 
country was already in a reciprocal information sharing relationship with the 
U.S.156 
But even these aspirational utterances toward a multilateral automatic 
information exchange network will be denied to most developing countries.  
This is because of the manner in which the U.S. is casting the IGAs as 
treaty-based agreements rather than treaties.157  The reason for doing so may 
be to bypass onerous treaty-making requirements—including achieving the 
advice and consent of the Senate—by couching the IGAs with an existing 
authority.  But the unintended consequence is that reciprocal IGAs can only 
be entered into with the U.S. on the strength of an existing tax agreement.158 
Accordingly, only those countries that have existing double tax 
conventions or tax information sharing agreements, or that have signed the 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (Mutual 
Assistance Convention), can hope to achieve even the nominally reciprocal 
relationship offered by an IGA.159  Without one of these agreements in place, 
a state would not be able to extract even that unequal bargain:160 there is 
 152.  Id. 
 153.   See, e.g., MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 6, at 6–9. 
 154.  See id. 
 155.  26 C.F.R.  1.6049-8 (2010). 
 156.   Id.  This observation explains why Canada, even more than other countries, stands to gain 
little or nothing in terms of base protection from an IGA with the U.S. 
 157.  See, e.g., MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 6, at 6–9. 
 158.  See id. at 1; Laila Arstall,  Jersey: FATCA—Intergovernmental Agreements for Crown 
Dependencies, MONDAQ (Dec. 17, 2012),  
http://www.mondaq.com/x/207552/tax+authorities/FATCA+InterGovernmental+Agreements+For+
Crown+Dependencies (noting the dependence of IGAs on existing tax treaties). 
 159.   See MODEL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT, supra note 6, at 1 
 160.  Robert W. Wood, Expats Call for FATCA Repeal, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2011, 8:22 AM), 
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apparently no current government-to-government FATCA alternative for 
countries that lack tax agreements with the U.S.  As the U.S. history of tax 
agreements historically excludes the global south, the IGA regime 
necessarily excludes most of it as well.161 
The result is that poor countries, for which illicit flows of capital 
heading for sanctuary in U.S. accounts represents a major and even 
catastrophic loss of revenue, will not gain much opportunity to protect their 
own tax bases under the FATCA/IGA regime.  What is perhaps even more 
serious for the international tax regime is that the U.S., having achieved its 
own objectives with respect to information flow on a unilateral basis, will 
have no reason to bargain multilaterally with these countries in any other 
forum.  Far from creating a step toward global automatic information 
sharing, FATCA appears poised to separate the globe into information haves 
and information have-nots, with rich countries as the major beneficiaries. 
These are grave policy failures for the U.S. that should cause great 
concern for those who think information flows are just as critical to 
development in poor countries as they are to the preservation of the welfare 
state in rich ones.  Because FATCA is framed in defensive terms as a 
protection of the U.S. tax base, and a preservation of fairness for U.S. 
taxpayers as against each other,162 the concerns of the global poor are 
overlooked and ignored in the conversation.  Unless these violations are 
addressed, FATCA threatens to turn information into a commodity that can 
only be extracted by rich countries and will be used by those countries for 
their own advantage, even as they perversely maintain institutional and 
regulatory support for tax evasion by persons from other jurisdictions.  That 
is a serious issue for anyone who is concerned with defining a reasonable 
jurisdiction for the state as a member responsible to others in an 
international society of states. 
B.  EITI: First Implement It, Then Expand It 
EITI, like FATCA, has great potential for reasserting the state’s role in 
regulating taxation on a global basis.163  EITI’s potential lies in the assertion 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/09/06/expats-call-for-fatca-repeal. 
 161.   The U.S. Treasury could intend to extend IGA eligibility to members of the OECD Mutual 
Assistance Convention, thus potentially increasing the scope for reciprocity, but it is not clear that 
this could be done on a bilateral, case-by-case basis.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
STATUS OF THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS AND 
AMENDING PROTOCOL (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/Status_of_convention.pdf. 
 162.  See Dana Ward & Anne Stopford, FATCA—Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, WORLD 
FIN. REV., http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=616 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
 163.  See Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The Implications of the 
Resource Curse for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 37, 51 (2008). 
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that all stakeholders—including shareholders, governments, and civil society 
at large—have an interest in knowing how public companies and 
governments behave and interact internationally.  This observation leads 
logically to an inquiry into the limited scope of EITI.  But if disclosure 
would solve information asymmetries in the market to the benefit of 
stakeholders in the U.S. and around the world, one may well wonder why it 
is limited to the extractive industries. Answering this question reveals some 
obstacles that still need to be overcome for EITI to fulfill its potential. 
The first obstacle to overcome is resistance to public disclosure.  As in 
the case of FATCA, vociferous opposition has significantly delayed the 
implementation of the enacting legislation.164  Industry resistance delayed the 
promulgation of interpretive regulations—just as it did in FATCA—and it is 
delaying the actual disclosure required by the legislation—again, in a 
parallel to FATCA.  But in this case, the resistance does not derive primarily 
from what may have been unintended effects of the legislation based on its 
interaction with other laws, as is arguably the case with FATCA.  Instead, 
the resistance is from the direct target of the regulation, namely, the 
extractive industries themselves.165  One surprising aspect of this resistance 
is that it is emanating from some who continue to voice strong support for 
EITI principles internationally.166 
In a sign of the global nature of tax policymaking, the E.U.’s imminent 
adoption of a more lax standard than that enumerated in the EITI rules has 
 164.   See Alex Barker & Guy Chazen, Lobbyists Fight to Weaken Graft Rules, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 
11, 2012, 8:25 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a8a59acc-83d4-11e1-84ca-00144feab49a.html 
(discussing how industry lobbyists are working to “dilute ‘project-by-project’ disclosure rules being 
developed in the U.S. and the E.U.); Edward Wyatt, Use of ‘Conflict Minerals’ Gets More Scrutiny 
from U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,  2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/business/use-of-
conflict-minerals-gets-more-scrutiny.html (discussing how industry pressure has undermined and 
consistently sidelined EITI implementation).. 
 165.   See Ken Silverstein, As Oil Pours into Gulf, Oil Industry Fights Anti-Corruption Measure, 
HARPERS (May 11, 2010), http://harpers.org/archive/2010/05/hbc-90007021 (explaining the 
opposition of the American Petroleum Institute, a trade association that represents the U.S. oil and 
gas industry); Publish What You Pay USA, Oil Company Lawsuit Against US SEC Threatens EITI, 
GLOBAL WITNESS (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.globalwitness.org/library/oil-company-lawsuit-
against-us-sec-threatens-eiti (describing American Petroleum Institute lawsuit to repeal EITI 
disclosure).  For an overview of similar resistance by the Canadian mining industry in response to 
parallel legislation proposed there see Sharp Criticism for Bill C-300: Lawyers Tell Parliamentary 
Committee Private Member’s Bill Threatens Canada’s Minerals Industry, FASKEN MARTINEAU 
(Nov. 26, 2009), www.fasken.com/firm-opposes-bill-c-300-in-ottawa/; Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Bill C-300, PROSPECTORS & DEVS. ASS’N OF CAN., http://www.pdac.ca/public-
affairs/corporate-social-responsibility/public-affairs/2012/01/03/bill-c-300 (explaining the role 
PDAC played in opposing the passage of Act 300). 
 166.   See, e.g., supra note 51. 
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served to invigorate industry resistance to EITI in the U.S.  This 
demonstrates that, like FATCA, EITI is a means of halting a regulatory race 
to the bottom.167  In the case of information, the race is in the direction of 
minimal disclosure standards.  As one report observed, “[i]f the compromise 
passes in Brussels, it will bolster industry arguments that the U.S. rules 
implementing Dodd-Frank should be watered down to match the E.U. 
approach and ensure a level playing field.”168  But a level playing field 
would quite obviously exist if the global market has full information; that is, 
if all multinational companies engaged in full disclosure of their tax 
payments in all countries and if all stakeholders—shareholders, 
taxpayers, governments, and watchdog groups—had the same information 
about how multinationals engage in pitting countries against each other in 
the global tax competition game.169 
Accordingly, the best possible path forward for EITI is to overcome 
industry opposition and enforce the law that is already on the books, but also 
to expand disclosure beyond the extractive industries to all public 
companies.  This will engender (and in concept has already engendered) 
additional resistance, but it is the only legitimate solution to the level playing 
field problem.170  At a meeting of the OECD Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes held in 2010, U.K. Tax 
Minister Stephen Timms stated that the OECD ought to lead a global 
discussion on broad-based EITI-style disclosure by multinationals, on the 
grounds that “there should be transparency about where companies earn 
their profits and where they pay their tax.”171  Timms stated that the OECD 
ought to issue multinational guidelines through a process of discussion 
among governments, multinationals, and civil society, in order to define a 
standard that would then become globalized through the OECD’s soft law 
channels.172 
Both EITI and FATCA emerge in the context of a waning of public trust 
of the state amidst stories of rampant and too-often unpunished fraud and 
abuse of the tax system by individuals and multinationals.173  These failures 
 167.  See Christians, supra note 112, at 844. 
 168.   Barker & Chazen, supra note 164. 
 169.  See Genasci & Pray, supra note 163, at 51–54; EITI’s Evolution from CSR to Governance 
Standard Is Key to Emerging Economies, EITI NEWS (EITI INT’L SECRETARIAT, Oslo, Nor.), July 
2010, at 5, available at http://eiti.org/files/EITI-Newsletter-2010-July.pdf. 
 170.   See Morris, supra note 123. 
 171.   Stephen Timms, U.K. Fin. Sec’y to the Treasury, Remarks at OECD Tax and Development 
Conference in Paris, (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/speech_fst_270110.htm. 
 172.   See id. 
 173.   See Rick Cohen, Bono, the Edge, Charges of Tax Evasion, and More, NONPROFIT Q. (July 
14, 2011, 4:39 PM), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/updates/14041-bono-the-edge-charges-of-
tax-evasion-and-more.html; Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax 
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of the state are juxtaposed against the equal failure of large revenue 
shortfalls and cuts to public sector programs through austerity-based 
reforms.174  The search for greater accountability with respect to the taxes 
ostensibly sought by governments, but avoided by individuals and 
multinationals, is an appropriate response in principle, but much remains to 
be worked out in the implementation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The first Obama administration undertook some important steps forward 
in protecting the income tax against its ongoing erosion under the pressures 
of globalization.175  The second (and future U.S. administrations) could do 
more, and better.  The first step forward must include addressing some of the 
unresolved and important oversights created by its initial legislation; in 
particular, those provisions that pertain to working out a reasonable 
jurisdictional reach for the tax state.  This will require addressing the 
problems presented by FATCA without going too far in the direction of 
aiding and abetting criminal activity including tax evasion.  In turn, this will 
require the United States to reconsider the appropriateness of citizenship-
based taxation with respect to individuals who live abroad and hold dual or 
multiple citizenship or permanent residence status, perhaps especially when 
such persons reside in countries that impose high taxes on their residents.  
By resolving these issues, the United States should be able to relieve some 
of the international resistance to FATCA on the grounds that it unduly 
interferes with the exercise of jurisdiction by an equally positioned 
Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-
rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html; Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html; 
Glenn Greenwald, HSBC, Too Big to Jail, Is the New Poster Child for US Two-Tiered Justice 
System, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/12/hsbc-
prosecution-fine-money-laundering; James S Henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited, TAX JUST. 
NETWORK (July 2012), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_ 
120722.pdf (noting that $21 to $31 trillion is invested tax free via offshore holdings). 
 174.   See France Needs More Reform not Austerity: EU’s Rehn,  EUBUSINESS (Dec. 21, 2012),  
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/finance-public-debt.ljn; Paul Krugman, The Austerity Bomb, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2012, 9:22 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/the-austerity-
bomb/; Paul Krugman, Hasty Fiscal Fix to Deficit Would Cause ‘Austerity Bomb’, PBS NEWSHOUR 
(Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec12/krugman_12-04.html; Costas 
Meghir, et al., Greece Needs Growth, Not Austerity, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-20/greece-needs-growth-not-austerity.html; . 
 175.  See Jeanne Sahadi, Obama: Slash Corporate Tax Breaks and Rates, CNN MONEY (Feb. 22, 
2012, 2:51 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/22/news/economy/obama_corporate_taxes/index. 
htm. 
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sovereign, paving the way for renewed cooperation on a multilateral basis 
with the intended target of FATCA—namely, international tax evasion 
perpetrated by wealthy Americans who live in the United States. 
The second step forward is to expand the accountability of financial and 
nonfinancial institutions to stakeholders, which includes civil society as a 
whole.  This can and should be accomplished by making FATCA fully 
reciprocal by expanding the reporting requirements applicable to U.S. 
financial institutions and by adopting more, and more inclusive, automatic 
information sharing mechanisms, especially for the benefit of poor countries.  
It should also be advanced by expanding EITI beyond the extractive 
industries sector, so that stakeholders can assess the fruits of the 
international tax rules that have encouraged the erosion of the income tax 
base. 
 
